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RESTORING POLLUTED WATERS WITH PUBLIC VALUES
WENDY E. WAGNER*
Watershed management is one of the oldest and most widely
accepted tools for protecting water quality. For centuries, it has been
understood that enhancing water quality is best accomplished by
restricting polluting activities within a drainage area.' Even individuals
not well-versed in technical issues, such as U.S. congresspersons, have
appreciated the importance of watershed management to water quality
protection. Since the 1950s, federal clean water statutes and their
amendments have promoted watershed management as a method for
protecting water quality.2 Indeed, our legislative commitment to the tools
of watershed management has only grown more emphatic over time.
3
Yet despite the continued prominence of watershed management in
the laws governing water quality control, until very recently there has been
little effort by federal or state agencies to actually implement watershed
* Professor, University of Texas School of Law. I am most grateful to the editors of the
WILLIAM AND MARY JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY REVIEW for
inviting me to participate in this symposium, and to the participants at the symposium for
valuable comments and insights. Many thanks also to Melvyn Durchslag and Michael
Walker for comments on an earlier draft and to Tanya Aure for excellent research
assistance.
I See, e.g., Robert W. Adler, Addressing Barriers to Watershed Protection, 25 ENVTL. L.
973, 1004-13 (1995) (recounting how well established watershed management has been
historically); see also id. at 976 (providing rough definition of watershed management
that includes "'[t]he entire surface drainage area that contributes water to a lake or
river."') (quoting NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RESTORATION OF AQUATIC
ECOSYSTEMS: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 524 (1992)).
2 For a comprehensive accounting of federal legislation that promotes watershed based
restoration and protection, see Adler, supra note 1, at 1037-87; see also Scott D.
Anderson, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 339, 367-72 (1999) (detailing history of
watershed management); William Goldfarb, Watershed Management: Slogan or
Solution?, 21 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 483, 486-89 (1994) (recounting history of
watershed management, and relating it to the concept of 'unified river basin
management' of the early 1900s).
3 See, e.g., Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs: The Resurrection of Water Quality Standards-
Based Regulation Under the Clean Water Act, 27 Envtl. L. Rep. 10329, 10331-43 (1997)
(detailing history of watershed-based water quality protections in the various incarnations
of the Clean Water Act).
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management into their regulatory programs.4 With a few notable
exceptions, watershed management has played at best a minor role in the
thirty year, billion-dollar effort to clean up our rivers and lakes. 5 Instead,
most of the expenditures and administrative resources have been dedicated
to a watershed-blind approach to protecting water quality that requires
industrial and other "point sources" to install the equivalent of the best
available technology to control their discharge irrespective of the quality
of the receiving waters.6
There are indications, however, that we may be reaching a
watershed point in the use of watershed management as a tool for
improving water quality. Technology-based standards have now been
implemented for virtually all point sources of water pollution, yet the
water quality of many rivers and lakes continues to be degraded.7
Moreover, because much of this degradation results from largely
4 This article addresses water quality protection, which is admittedly only a piece of the
larger watershed restoration picture. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 1, at 1101 (advocating
broader programs of watershed protection that include flow considerations and that
account for "all aspects of the hydrological cycle, including links between land and
water, water quality and quantity, and groundwater and surface water."); cf Goldfarb,
supra note 2, at 489 (arguing that "except for the broad outlines of nonpoint source
pollution control strategies, watershed management-like its predecessor unified river
basin management- has no consistently accepted descriptive meaning, either conceptual
or operational."). Given the focus on citizen participation in this article, however, it
seems appropriate to start with a discrete issue. The findings can then be extrapolated, if
appropriate, to other features of watershed management or to environmental law more
enerally.
See, e.g., Houck, supra note 3, at 10343 (observing that as the Clean Water Act moved
into the 1990s, "its federal technology standards work[ed] significant reductions in
pollution discharges, its state water quality standards, with a few notable exceptions,
[constituted] a distant and lightly attended second."); see also Michael P. Healy, Still
Dirty After Twenty-Five Years: Water Quality Standard Enforcement and the Availability
of Citizen Suits, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 393, 395, 414-29 (1997) (concluding that "evaluated
from a variety of perspectives, the enforcement of the water quality-based system of
gollution control [under the Clean Water Act] must be viewed as a failure.").
See Houck, supra note 3, at 10343.
7See, e.g., U.S. EPA, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE TOTAL
MAXIMUM DAILY LOAD (TMDL) PROGRAM 8 (1998) [hereinafter FACA REPORT]
(relating that "of the 19 percent of the nation's rivers and streams that have been
assessed, 35 percent do not fully support water quality standards or uses and 8 percent are
considered threatened... [and of] the 40 percent of lakes, ponds and reservoirs assessed
(not including the Great Lakes), 39 percent are not fully supporting uses/standards and 10
percent are threatened.") (citing EPA's final National Water Quality Inventory Report to
Congress for 1996).
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unregulated nonpoint sources,8  calls for greater use of watershed
management tools from both the policymaking and academic communities
has become increasingly insistent.
9
Yet, it is precisely because the concept of watershed management
is so non-controversial that its conspicuous absence in regulatory
programs needs to be understood. This essay endeavors to supplement
other efforts to explain why water quality protection programs have
struggled so unsuccessfully to incorporate watershed management into
water quality regulation.' 0 The reason advanced in this article for the
failure to integrate watershed management into water quality control
See, e.g., GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GREATER EPA LEADERSHIP NEEDED TO
REDUCE NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION 8 (1990) (reporting that nonpoint source
pollution is predominant problem for 76 percent of the lakes, 65 percent of the streams,
and 45 percent of the estuaries that fail to meet water quality standards); Adler, supra
note 1, at 990 (citing numerous sources to support statement that "[p]olluted runoff is the
largest source of water pollution in the United States and a major source of physical and
hydrological impairment and habitat loss."); Farm, Urban Runoff, Municipal Sources
Top Pollution Causes, EPA Tells Congress, 24 Env't Rep. 2228, 2228 (1994).
9 The culmination of efforts within the policy-making community is the FACA REPORT,
supra note 7, which provides an assessment by a variety of experts on how best to
improve the effectiveness, efficiency and pace of TMDL programs. This report was
prompted not only (or even primarily) by the demand for cleaner water, however, but by
a rash of citizen suits forcing the EPA and states into action. See, e.g., Oliver A. Houck,
TMDLs, Are We There Yet?: The Long Road Toward Water Quality-Based Regulation
Under the Clean Water Act, 27 Envtl. L. Rep. 10391 (1997) [hereinafter Houck II].
On the academic side, Professors Adler and Houck have each provided superb
accounts of the history and progress of water quality control programs and the TMDL
programs in particular. See generally Adler, supra note 1 (providing a very thorough
account of various regulatory programs designed to employ watershed management and
describing and hypothesizing about their limited success); Robert W. Adler, Integrated
Approaches to Water Pollution: Lessons from the Clean Air Act, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 203 (1999) (considering whether the Clean Air Act offers insights for
implementation of water quality backup programs under the Clean Water Act); Houck,
supra note 3 (describing the origin of the TMDL program); Houck II, supra
(documenting its historic failure and recent success as a result of citizen suits); Oliver A.
Houck, TMDLs III: A New Framework for the Clean Water Act's Ambient Standards
Program, 28 Envtl. L. Rep. 10415 (1998) [hereinafter Houck III] (describing EPA's
current activities to implement the program); Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs IV: The Final
Frontier, 29 Envtl. L. Rep. 10469 (1999) [hereinafter, Houck, IV] (considering the larger
problems raised by the TMDL program and whether the program can achieve results).
For a compilation of these articles by Professor Houck, as well as his additional, more
recent research on TMDLs, see OLIVER A. HOUCK, THE CLEAN WATER ACT TMDL
PROGRAM: LAW, POLICY, AND IMPLEMENTATION (1999).
10 See sources cited supra note 9. This essay takes these accounts as the starting point
and endeavors to offer one additional, but significant, reason why the water quality
control programs have not been successful.
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regulation is somewhat counterintuitive, however. Rather than call for
investments in still more scientific experts or technocratic tools to improve
water quality, it is suggested that we may need less of these things. The
problem, simply put, is that watershed management and the associated
requirements for clean waters have been misframed as technical issues,
when in fact public discourse is required for significant progress to be
made in restoring degraded waters. While experience suggests that the
threat of rigorous federal standards is essential to improve water quality,II
experience also reveals that some of the greatest strides in environmental
protection are made when these requirements form only the default rules
for ensuring environmental quality, providing ample room for creative
approaches that go above and beyond minimal federal guidelines. 2 In the
area of watershed-based water quality protection, however, the default
requirements-the Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) program-
impose a mandatory process that seems to have the effect of preempting
more creative or public-spirited approaches to protecting water quality.,
The unrealistic technical demands imposed by the TMDL requirements
not only consume agency resources that could be used to involve the
public in enhancing water quality, but they may also alienate all but the
most dedicated citizens and local communities from participating in water
quality decisions. Yet without the support or involvement of the public,
particularly at the state level where much of the regulatory authority rests,
water protection programs are bound to drift aimlessly and ultimately
fail.'
4
This analysis of the ways in which involvement and support of the
public is both critical to and largely missing from current efforts to
integrate watershed management into water quality control is developed in
four parts. In the first part, the current state of our water quality programs
is detailed with particular attention to their over-reliance on technical and
11 See, e.g., infra note 115 and accompanying text; see generally EPA, Final Rule:
Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation and Revisions to
the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program in Support of Revisions to
the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 65 Fed. Reg. 43586, 43586(2000) (EPA's TMDL regulations are designed to provide "clear goals for identification
of impaired waterbodies and establishment of TMDLs.") [hereinafter "Final TMDL
Regulations"].
12 See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 67-71.
13See infra Part III.
14 See infra Part II. The criticisms advanced in this article regarding the adverse effect of
the TMDL program on participation are based on the TMDL program in existence before
EPA's TMDL regulations were revised in July 2000, see Final TMDL Regulations, supra
note 11, although as noted, infra, EPA's latest regulations do not alleviate the problems.
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scientific tools. In the second part, the central role of the citizen in
integrating watershed management into water quality protection programs
is detailed. The multiple ways in which citizens are impeded from
participating in water quality control decisions-a problem that is often
overlooked in discussions of how to better incorporate watershed
management in water quality control programs-is outlined in the third
part. In the fourth and final part, several reforms will be offered that can
be used to increase the extent to which the public serves as an active
participant in the quest for cleaner waters.
I. THE CLEAN WATER ACT'S FRAMING ERROR: IGNORING THE ART AND
EXAGGERATING THE SCIENCE OF WATERSHED MANAGEMENT
Current federal laws and regulations that attempt to integrate
watershed management into water quality regulation insist on the use of
scientific and technical tools that outstrip the capabilities of existing
watershed management science. While these unrealistic federal
requirements are effective when they serve as default or motivating
requirements for states that refuse to meet minimum national
requirements, they are not effective when they function as mandatory
requirements that supplant all other approaches to protecting water quality.
Currently, however, these federal requirements appear to preempt all other
approaches to improving water quality. In this section, the problems with
this current regulatory approach are detailed. The resulting adverse
consequences for citizen involvement-the essential component of any
successful water quality protection strategy-are then outlined in Parts II
and III.
A. The Water Quality March
There is considerable evidence that Congress is enamored with
scientific and associated technical approaches to addressing environmental
problems.' 5 Not only do technical approaches garner great respect from
the public, but these super-rational approaches also allow congresspersons
1 See, e.g., Holly Doremus, Listing Decisions Under the Endangered Species Act: Why
Better Science Isn't Always Better Policy, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1029 (1997) (criticizing
Congress' "strictly science" mandate for listing endangered and threatened species
because it is scientifically unrealistic and essentially impossible); Wendy E. Wagner,
Congress, Science, and Environmental Policy, 1999 U. ILL. L. REv. 181 (arguing that
Congress tends to misframe many policy questions arising in environmental law as
capable of being resolved by science).
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to avoid controversy that could potentially cost them their jobs in the next
election.1 6 It is thus not surprising to see this infatuation with scientific
answers and methods reflected in Congress' effort to integrate the
concepts of watershed management into water quality control programs.
While Congress is right to integrate watershed management into water
quality control, it has done so in the wrong way by misframing watershed
management as predominantly a technical exercise.
Both in the initial 1972 statute and in subsequent major
amendments to the Clean Water Act, Congress developed an extravagant
and obsessively rational approach to integrating watershed concepts into
water quality control programs. 17 While the Clean Water Act includes a
number of watershed planning requirements,' 8 as well as requirements for
adding restrictions on point sources when water is degraded, 19 only the
TMDL program seeks to accomplish both of these objectives
simultaneously. Specifically, the TMDL program endeavors to impose
enforceable limits on bothpoint and nonpoint sources based on the needs
of the receiving waters.2  Characterized here as the "water quality
16 See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 15, at 221-57 (providing examples and literature that
suggest a number of reasons why Congress may misframe environmental policy
Tuestions as science problems).
See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (1994). As Professor Houck observes: "As [Bill Rodgers] has
noted, the TMDL process is a 'monument to the ambitions of rational decision making.'
At the bottom of this monument, however, is 'an acutely political judgment' as to whose
ox will be gored." Oliver A. Houck, The Regulation of Toxic Pollutants Under the Clean
Water Act, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. 10528, 10546 (1991) (quoting 2 W. ROGERS,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 281 (1986)).
18 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1288 (requiring area-wide waste treatment management plans);
§ 1313(e) (advocating comprehensive water-quality program planning); § 1329 (calling
on states to develop watershed management plans).
19 See 33 U.S.C. § 1314(1) (the "Individual Control Strategy" program).
20 See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d). The EPA defines a TMDL as
a quantitative assessment of pollutants that cause water quality
impairments. A TMDL specifies the amount of a particular pollutant
that may be present in a waterbody, allocates allowable pollutant loads
among sources, and provides the basis for attaining or maintaining
water quality standards. TMDLs are established for waterbody and
pollutant combinations of waterbodies impaired by point sources,
nonpoint sources, or a combination of both point and nonpoint sources.
Final TMDL Regulations, supra note 11, at 43588; see also FACA REPORT, supra note 7,
at 10 (observing that while "[m]any provisions of the [Clean Water] Act address impaired
waters and authorize actions to improve water quality . . . only the § 303(d)(1) TMDL
program provisions focus broadly on waters that do not meet water quality standards,
including beneficial uses."). But see infra note 49 (discussing the contention that TMDLs
do not apply to nonpoint sources).
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march," the legislation sets forth a series of consecutive, technical
exercises that must be satisfied in order to develop an enforceable TMDL
program that incorporates watershed management principles. 21 See Figure
1.




TMDLs -* Enforceable Limits
In the first step, the state identifies, with minimal federal
interference, 22 the ideal public uses for the water, including aspirations
that a particular river or stream be "swimmable," "fishable," "drinkable,"
etc. 23  During the second step of the march, the state sets specific
standards that match the various uses.24 For contact recreation, for
example, a state could decide that coliform levels must be below a
particular quantitative standard, or it could simply provide a qualitative
standard that identified the end goal (e.g.,"no pollution will be tolerated
that causes the river to be unsuitable for swimming."). 25 In the third step,
21 For a more detailed discussion of these requirements, see Adler, supra note 9, at 209-
230.
22 States at a minimum are directed to ensure waters are "fishable and swimmable." See,
e.g., Adler, supra note 9, at 209 n.35 (describing uncertain origin of "fishable and
swimmable" requirement). Waters must also not be degraded below their existing
condition unless "necessary to accommodate important economic or social development."
40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a)(2) (1999).
23 See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A) ("Such standards shall be established taking into
consideration their use and value for public water supplies, propagation of fish and
wildlife, recreational purposes, and agricultural, industrial, and other purposes.").
24 See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2). The EPA must approve the standards, § 1313(c)(2)-(4),
although it has typically provided the states considerable discretion due in part to the
considerable scientific uncertainties involved in the exercise. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §
131.11.
25 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 131.3(b), 131.11 (providing states with latitude to set criteria based
on pollutant concentrations or narrative statements). Some federal restrictions also apply
to this stage, primarily in the form of more specific anti-degradation requirements. See,
e.g., Adler, supra note 9, at 213-15.
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the state uses its monitoring resources to identify those waters that are not
meeting their designated use.26 This requires matching the water quality
data of the state's waters against the standards set for each waterbody
based on its designated use.27 In the fourth and final step, the state
develops enforceable pollution control plans for degraded waters based on
its quantification of the loading of pollutants and its understanding of
problem sources within the watershed.28 Both point and nonpoint sources
of the problematic pollutants are typically considered and their
contributions to the problem assessed. A plan is then developed that
requires these sources to reduce their loading to a level that ensures that
the water will ultimately meet its designated use (the total maximum daily
load).29
B. Potholes and Missteps in the Water Quality March
Despite its curb appeal, practical implementation of this march has
faltered at nearly every step. Only the first step of the march-statewide
zoning of waters according to their intended and aspirational uses-seems
to occur without significant bureaucratic turmoil. 3° The next step, which
involves developing water quality standards that provide measurable
criteria for determining whether the pollution is low enough to satisfy a
designated use (such as being swimmable or fishable), 31 has been fraught
with delays and inconsistencies. For the first fifteen or more years after
passage of the Clean Water Act, many states were reluctant to adopt
quantitative water quality standards. 32  But even when states do set
26 See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(A). More specific federal guidance on how to determine
or rank impaired waters is quite limited. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 9, at 217.27 See id.; see also Houck IV, supra note 9, at 10477 ("identifying polluted waters is,
from the point of view of the science involved, the easy step.").
28 See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C).
29 For the TMDL program, these allocation requirements (which include an obligation to
consider nonpoint sources) are imposed on the states mainly through regulatory
requirements. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 130.2(g), (i) (defining "load allocation" and "total
maximum daily load" to include nonpoint sources). For a summary of the TMDL
process, see U.S. EPA, GUIDANCE FOR WATER QUALITY-BASED DECISIONS: THE TMDL
PROCESS, at http://www.epa.gov/owowwtrl/tmdl/decisions/dec3.html (Chapter Three:
Development and Implementation of the TMDL) (last visited Oct. 11, 2000).
30 At least there is little in the literature regarding problems at this step.
31 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
32 See, e.g., ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW,
SCIENCE, AND POLICY 938 (2d ed. 1996) (reporting that "[s]tates were slow to promulgate
water quality standards, despite issuance of EPA criteria. Most states failed to
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specific pollutant levels for different uses, their standards can vary by as
much as 1000-fold with regard to how much pollution can be tolerated to
support waters for recreation or basic uses.33  With respect to the third
step, which instructs states to monitor the quality of their waters, 34 as of
1996 only 19 percent of all water miles had been assessed.3 5 As might be
expected from the sequential nature of the march, however, the greatest
failures have occurred during the last step of the march where the statute
seems to contemplate that states implement watershed management
concepts into an enforceable water quality plan.36 To date, progress in
promulgate numerical standards for toxics or adopted standards far more lenient than
those recommended by EPA's criteria.").
33 See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. United States EPA, 16 F.3d 1395, 1398,
1403-1405 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that the EPA could approve water quality standards
set by the states of Maryland and Virginia that allowed dioxin concentrations almost
1000 times more lenient than recommended by the EPA because of inherent scientific
uncertainties regarding risks of dioxin).
Efforts to include more holistic biological criteria become even more difficult to
apply with precision, see, e.g., Adler, supra note 9, at 261 (observing how some of these
water quality measurements "require human observation and subjective judgment,
compared to straightforward objective numeric measurements, which often can be done
by automatic monitoring methods."), despite their important role in helping to understand
water quality. See, e.g., PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY,
MURKY WATERS: OFFICIAL WATER QUALITY REPORTS ARE ALL WET 25 (May 1999)
[hereinafter PEER] (reporting on an EPA report that found that "[w]hen using biological
integrity indicators, the results of water quality problems were dramatically higher than
reported without these indicators."); Adler, supra note 1, at 984-85 (describing the
importance of biocriteria in understanding water quality impacts).
34See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
35 See FACA Report, supra note 7, at 8 (citing EPA's Final National Water Quality
Inventory Report to Congress for 1996); see also PEER, supra note 33, at 16 (reporting
that only 4 states reported assessing 100 percent of stream miles, "while 32 states
assessed less than 40 percent of their rivers and streams with an average of 15 percent.").
To add insult to this injury, some of the water quality assessments available are of poor
quality or have been reported in ways that obscure underlying problems. See, e.g., PEER,
supra note 33, at 2-3 (concluding in executive summary that "an unfortunate mix of
politics, bureaucratic inertia and bad science means that conflicting, erroneous, and
manipulated sets of water quality data containing little accurate information on the actual
condition of the nation's rivers and streams are routinely reported by States and dutifully
compiled by the EPA for presentation to Congress and the public.").
36 See, e.g., Adler, supra note 9, at 221-25 (describing the many technical and logistical
problems that afflict the TMDL calculations, and the particular difficulty associated with
attempting to quantify TMDLs in a reliable or precise way); Healy, supra note 5, at 423-
25 (detailing the ways in which the TMDL program has been "almost a total failure," due
to the EPA's historic disinterest in the program and the states' inactivity in implementing
its requirements).
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submitting TMDLs by the states has been painfully slow.37 Although
Congress declined to set deadlines in the statute, at least one court has
suggested that eleven years of inactivity by a state in implementing the
TMDL program constitutes a violation of the statute that the EPA must
remedy.
The reason for the historic failure of the TMDL program is
grounded in large part on the mistaken conception that watershed
management is a relatively precise science that can produce definitive
answers at each step of the march.39 Indeed, in the Clean Water Act,
Congress not only ignored the rampant scientific uncertainties that plague
watershed management, but it developed a water quality program that
seems to flaunt them. Each step of the water quality march takes the
agency into another, more technically impossible exercise than the one
before it. Setting water quality standards, developing comprehensive
water quality monitoring programs, and setting and enforcing further
pollution restrictions on problem point and nonpoint sources requires a
level of scientific precision that typically does not exist. For example,
because we know so little about aquatic ecology and the effects of the
hundreds of manmade pollutants on our rivers and streams, setting water
quality standards (the second step) involves making unverifiable
approximations.40 These scientific uncertainties, in fact, result in state-
37 See NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, POLLUTION PARALYSIS II: RED CODE FOR
WATERSHEDS 1-2 (2000) [hereinafter POLLUTION PARALYSIS II], at http://www.nwf.
org/watersheds/paralysis/pp2_report.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2000) (reporting, based on
application of thirty-six separate criteria to the fifty states' water quality programs, that
75 percent of the states have failed to develop meaningful TMDL programs); Houck III,
supra note 9, at 10439-43 (listing by location the TMDLs completed by April 1998,
which includes only forty-five water segments in the entire country).
38 See Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Reilly, 762 F. Supp. 1422 (W.D. Wash. 1991) (holding
that the state's failure to submit a single TMDL for its hundreds of impaired waters over
an eleven year period violated the statute). For a discussion and summary of all of the
other litigation brought by citizens against recalcitrant states for failing to implement
TMDLs, see Houck, supra note 3, at 10393-97; see also POLLUTION PARALYSIS II, supra
note 37, at 86 (listing over twenty-eight states that are or have been involved in litigation
over their TMDL programs).
39 See generally Houck IV, supra note 9, at 10474-79 (detailing the series of scientific
obstacles that arise in the TMDL program).
40 The assumptions are horrific, and include the need to consider: synergisms among
pollutants; varying concentrations in the sediments, water column, and micro-layer at the
top of the water; acute versus chronic harms; and whether the indicator species used in
the lab or out in the field are adequately representative of the ecosystem. See, e.g.,
PERCIVAL, supra note 32, at 941-42 (providing a brief, but clear accounting of the
scientific uncertainties arising in setting water quality standards); Adler, supra note 9, at
211-12 (discussing some of the scientific uncertainties in setting water quality criteria);
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specific standards and goals that are quite variable and hence particularly
misguided with respect to interstate waters.41 The same problems plague
what might seem to be a more straightforward exercise - monitoring the
quality of surface waters. Both because of the tremendous natural
variability in the background concentrations of pollutants in rivers and the
different approaches available for monitoring waters, consistent methods
for measuring water quality are difficult to develop. 42  Finally, setting
enforceable limits on problem sources in degraded waters requires its own
set of approximations. Pollutants entering waters from nonpoint sources
vary in their loading according to the type of storm event, the slope of the
land, the season, the vegetative cover, and so forth.4 3 Even point sources
Houck, supra note 17, at 10529-31 (detailing a series of major scientific uncertainties
encountered in the effort to set ambient water quality standards that must be squarely
addressed in order to arrive at a final standard); see also June F. Harrigan-Lum & Arnold
L. Lum, Hawaii's TMDL Program: Legal Requirements and Environmental Realities, 15
NAT. RESOURCES & ENv'T 12, 61 (2000) (discussing how state water quality standards
are inappropriate for Hawaiian streams because of the varying flow conditions among
different streams).
41 See, e.g., Houck IV, supra note 9, at 10477-78 (describing dozens of sources of
variability between states' water quality standards and recounting the general concerns by
commentators regarding the many "problems" inherent in ambient water quality criteria).
42 See, e.g., Wesley M. Jarrell, Getting Started with TMDLs 51 (Apr. 1999) (reporting
that "In most of the US, water quality and quantities in streams and lakes can change
dramatically over short periods of time .... As a result, wherever possible, it is best to
monitor water quality and flow continuously."), at http://www.ysi.com/ysi/envweb.nsf
(last visited Sept. 1, 2000); see also PEER, supra note 33, at 17 (identifying EPA's
flexible requirements for monitoring and noting that under EPA's guidelines, "almost any
type of monitoring is considered equivalent to another. For example, a grab sample of
dissolved oxygen taken daily is considered as scientifically valid an assessment tool as a
suite of 200 parameters sampled daily along with a suite of toxicity testing and
bioassessments."); Houck IV, supra note 9, at 10475-76 (discussing the problem of
inconsistent techniques in water quality monitoring and citing OTA and GAO studies that
make these same observations).
The situation is made worse by the EPA's apparent tendency to be lax on
enforcing those requirements that do exist. See, e.g., PEER, supra note 33, at 8 ("EPA
has never rejected a poor report [by a state on the quality of their waters]."); id. at 2
(concluding that because the EPA does not enforce federal requirements, "States have no
incentive to deliver accurate reports or to achieve comparability ..... .As a result,
inconsistencies in the amounts of waters monitored or evaluated as well as variations in
how impairment and designated use attainment are measured, produce a hodgepodge of
information that is of little value.").
43 See, e.g., Jarrell, supra note 42, at 2 (highlighting how nonpoint loads are tied to
weather events, and because of the variability of the land, reporting that "runoff flow
from a particular portion of the landscape is difficult to measure."); id. at 41-42
(concluding based on a list of factors and uncertainties encountered in determining
nonpoint loads that calculating the loads is a very uncertain exercise). Making pollution
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will mix and disperse into the waters in different ways that complicate
efforts to develop accurate pollution reduction requirements for the
various point sources. 44  To further compound these problems, legal
requirements at this fourth step are very unclear and subject to debate.45
As a result, the ultimate enforceable requirements of the TMDL
program are built on a house of cards: a series of difficult and often
impossible calculations that make the final requirement-additional
quantitative limits on specific problematic dischargers-scientifically
indefensible.46 The water quality march thus leads the states directly into
an unwelcome battle with industry and agricultural interests, while
loading determinations still more precarious is the growing realization that pollution
entering the river or lake from groundwater and from the air must also be accounted for
in the loading equation. See, e.g., FACA REPORT, supra note 7, at 59-67 (making
recommendations for "extremely difficult [TMDL] problems" caused by water quality
impairments that result from "historic problems, atmospheric deposition, and
modifications to flow."); Jarrell, supra note 42, at 47-49 (discussing groundwater and air
deposition contributions which likely escape any form of reliable quantification but
which can be significant in some waterbodies; for example, "the Chesapeake Bay
Program Office estimates that 21 percent of the nitrate entering the bay is from air
sources. About 46 percent of the cadmium in Tampa Bay reportedly falls from the
sky.").
4See, e.g., Healy, supra note 5, at 448-49 (describing controversies over whether mixing
zones, where effluent mixes with the receiving waters, should be used in determining
whether particular pollutant loadings adversely affect water quality). Additionally "point
sources cause the biggest problems during dry season, low-flow periods, because the flow
of the receiving water (the water the point source empties into) is less and so there is less
dilution of the concentrated point source." Jarrell, supra note 42, at 41. Point source
loads during low flows must then be compared with nonpoint loads during high flows in
determining the appropriate allocations or reductions for each, even though it appears that
this comparison involves incommensurables. See id. at 75 (attempting to suggest how
oint and nonpoint source loads can be integrated in developing TMDLs).
See, e.g., Adler, supra note 9, at 258 (recounting the uncertainty of whether TMDL
requirements apply in implementing antidegradation requirements); Jarrell, supra note
42, at 3 ("In the absence of very specific guidance documents from U.S. EPA, the key
components of TMDL development and monitoring hinge upon generating valid data and
communicating this data and associated results among all the stakeholders."); see also
infra note 49 (identifying vague requirements of the TMDL process that have led to
challenges and caused delay).46 Professor Houck states:
The WQA and its contemporaries were monuments of faith in the
commitment of state and local governments to secure clean water in the
face of powerful local interests; in the ability of science to predict
aquatic impacts and to trace observed impacts to their sources; and in
the practicality of treating water pollution through comprehensive,
regional planning.
Houck IV, supra note 9, at 10471.
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providing them with little analytical support once the battles begin.47
Predictably, states respond by following the path of least resistance. 48 The
absence of clear, enforceable deadlines or expectations in the statute and
regulations leave states with many avenues for avoiding the conflict,
although EPA's new TMDL requirements may eliminate at least a few of
the most egregious escape hatches in the future.49 But to the extent that
the water quality march remains discretionary, which is to some extent
inevitable, water quality programs will reflect the political interests within
each state.50  Non-monied interests (such as environmentalists or the
47 See, e.g., Houck IV, supra note 9, at 10480 (commenting that state TMDL programs
"vaporized on the will to do a very hard thing, to make demands on large, local industries
without the backing of explicit federal standards and permits and the threat of federal
enforcement.").
48 See, e.g., PEER, supra note 33, at 2-3 (concluding that states sometimes manipulate
data to make waters look cleaner than they are, or even to look dirtier if fuuding is
available for cleanup); POLLUTION PARALYSIS II, supra note ,37, at 16-18 (identifying the
many types of failures in state TMDL plans, including the states' failure to provide
complete lists of degraded waters, or to provide for meaningful implementation of
TMDLs); Houck IV, supra note 9, at 10473 ("the fact remains that the residual authority
was there in the law for states to do more-to do exactly what they said they were good
at and wanted to do-and they did no such thing.").
49 There are a series of arguments that various interests have raised to minimize the
requirements of the TMDL program, none of which has been completely successful.
First, agricultural and some business interests have argued that Section 303(d) does not
include nonpoint sources within the load calculation. See Adler, supra note 9, at 226-30;
Houck IV, supra note 9, at 10474 & n.84. Second, it has been argued that 303(d)
requires the states only to employ TMDLs in planning for water quality control, and does
not necessarily require them to institute enforceable controls on sources. Id. at 10474
n.85. Third, in defending themselves against citizen suits, the states have argued that
Section 303(d) provides no deadlines by which the states must complete their TMDL
programs. Some courts, however, have held that delays of eleven years can violate the
requirements. See Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Reilly, 762 F. Supp. 1422 (W.D. Wash.
1991). Finally, states have argued that the states (and the EPA) do not have the authority
to review the substantive quality of their TMDL programs-only whether they exist.
See, e.g., Houck II, supra note 9, at 10395-97 (summarizing the litigation on this feature
of the TMDL program and noting some success by plaintiffs against the states and the
EPA). The EPA appears to have resolved the debate to some extent with its new
regulations that demand relatively specific items from the states with respect to their
TMDL plans. See, e.g., Final TMDL Regulations, supra note 11, § 130.32, at 43667-69
(setting forth eleven mandatory elements of a TMDL, with an implementation plan
requirement that has its own eight required elements).
50 Cf infra note 111 and accompanying text (discussing some states' affinity for
stakeholder groups as a surrogate for greater citizen involvement). Even monitoring of
waters may be selective, albeit inadvertently. For example, Professor Adler relates that
"most data are collected in waters known to be polluted by point sources, . . . [and a]s a
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public at large) will be influential only to the extent that they have become
organized within a state and have sufficient resources to take part at each
step of the water quality march.51
The exaggerated reliance on analytical tools in the TMDL program
also increases administrative costs. Professor Houck estimates the
administrative price of undertaking the water quality march correctly
(which should not be confused with the costs of compliance) to be roughly
$4 billion per state, assuming that each state has 100 watersheds in need of
TMDLs.52 At least in some states, in fact, Professor Houck's estimate
might be overly conservative. Although not monetized, the State of Ohio,
for example, has identified 10,748 river miles and 115,468 lake acres (881
listed waters in all) that require TMDL determinations and follow-up
requirements on point and nonpoint sources. 53 To make matters worse,
many states have only begun the TMDL process. In the case of Ohio, for
example, TMDLs have been completed for only a few pollutants in one
segment of a river: the State has scheduled TMDLs for eight additional
segments over the next two years, leaving a backlog of 872 segments.
54
II. WATER QUALITY PROBLEMS BENEFIT FROM, AND MAY REQUIRE,
PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT FOR THEIR RESOLUTION
The decision about how best to integrate watershed management
principles into water quality control programs is not purely, or even
primarily, a technical one. Given existing limits of scientific knowledge
and technological capabilities, these decisions require public involvement
and deliberation throughout the regulatory process: at the beginning when
goals are established, in the middle when a means must be determined for
implementing these goals, and at the end when the goals are enforced.
Indeed, because water quality problems are so technically uncertain and so
result, waters impaired by nonpoint sources often fall through the existing monitoring and
assessment net." Adler, supra note 9, at 258-59.
51 See generally infra Part III (detailing the external costs and benefits that affect citizen
articipation).See Houck IV, supra note 9, at 10476; see also Harrigan-Lum & Lum, supra note 40,
at 61 (observing how the costs for Hawaii to prepare TMDLs are likely to approach $1
million).
See U.S. EPA, Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) Program: 1998 303(d) List Fact
Sheet: Ohio at http://www.epa.gov/OWOW/tmdl/states/ohfact.html (last visited Sept. 1,
2000).
54 See, e.g., Ohio EPA, Fact Sheet on Total Maximum Daily Load Program at
http://chagrin.epa.state.oh.us/programs/tmdl/index.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2000); see
also supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
442 [Vol.25:429
2000 RESTORING POLLUTED WATERS WITH PUBLIC VALUES
costly for the point and nonpoint sources responsible for the pollution,
water quality control may be especially dependant on public input for
progress to be made. The ways in which water quality decision-making
benefits from, if not demands, public involvement are detailed in this
section.
First, as long as the analytical tools are highly imprecise, as they
are in the area of water quality science and watershed management, value
judgments and policy choices are necessary to determine whether and how
to clean up degraded waters. 56 And unless the public has indicated that it
wishes these significant policy decisions to be made by scientists or
technocrats without their input, then the public must be involved.
57
Indeed, without the public's participation in or acknowledgement of the
significant policy decisions, not only will the decisionmakers not be
accountable, but the decisions may not comport with the public's
interests.5 8  Particularly when painful economic sacrifices become
"i The utilitarian values of citizen participation in specific types of pollution control
programs, like the water quality control program, is elaborated in greater detail in a
current research project, tentatively entitled "The Silenced Screams in Environmental
Law" (working draft available from author).
56 The allocation of reductions among various point and nonpoint sources is particularly
political and nonscientific. See, e.g., Jarrell, supra note 42, at 41-42 (highlighting the
numerous uncertainties involved in determining nonpoint loads); see also FACA
REPORT, supra note 7, at 75 ("The Committee recommends that EPA encourage
relatively more public outreach in TMDLs where 'best professional judgment' [made
necessary by substantial uncertainties] will be more heavily relied upon.").
57 The Federal Advisory Committee on TMDLs in fact criticized existing TMDL efforts
by both the EPA and the states with respect to their failure to adequately include the
public and interested stakeholders in the process. See, e.g., FACA REPORT, supra note 7,
at 11 (observing that it is "critical that States and the public exchange information and
views [on TMDL-related issues] early in the process," but noting that "State and EPA
public communications on TMDLs need to be more inclusive and consistent than they
have been to date."); id. (similarly observing that "[a]gencies sometimes lose sight of the
need to motivate and involve those who can or are required to take action to remedy
water quality impairments. Inviting and encouraging stakeholders to become involved
and winning their support and commitment to implement TMDLs is important in all
aspects of the program."). Unfortunately, however, the Committee did not consider the
possibility that the inherent characteristics of the TMDL process may be partly to blame
for the difficulties states have in involving the public in meaningful ways on water
Vality decisions.
For example, while technocrats may ultimately find themselves responsible for making
the key decisions regarding water quality, it is at least as possible that these decisions will
be made even more invisibly by the well-financed or otherwise politically influential
interest groups at the state or local levels. Cf. infra notes 111-14 and accompanying text;
see also Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Continuing Innovation of Citizen Enforcement,
200 U. ILL. L. REv. 185, 209-11 (describing the democratic values facilitated by citizen
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necessary, as they are in trying to clean degraded waters, only broad-based
public support will be sufficient to move the program forward and keep it
in line with the community's goals and values.
Moreover, for complex problems involving multiple polluting
sources, legal requirements often prove incomplete. Administrative
resources are insufficient to establish, monitor, and enforce pollutant
limits for all sources of concern, and thus usually only the largest or
easiest to regulate sources are targeted. To the extent that ambitious
public goals are set for local waters, then, public support and commitment
is needed not only to increase "community policing" of larger sources, but
also to minimize the extent to which residences and other difficult-to-
regulate sources contribute pollution through overfertilization of lawns
and other practices. Public education and participation in the decision-
making process raises one's consciousness with regard to the pollution of
others, while also forcing a recognition of one's own contribution to the
problem.5
9
In a related vein, involving the local community in decisions about
how to improve water quality increases the information available about a
resource. In a number of states, citizens already help supplement available
information on a body of water, by for example, volunteering to collect
basic water quality data on a regular basis.6  Even more importantly,
citizens can also bring to the decision-making process important historic
facts (e.g., about water flow and episodic pollutant loads) that might have
been overlooked by an agency or other stakeholders. Citizens may also be
more likely to think creatively about alternative approaches to repairing
waters than technicians and distant bureaucrats. 61 Thus, citizens are not
suits, which include the ability of citizens to advocate values that are missing in state or
federal environmental regulatory programs).
See, e.g., CHESAPEAKE BAY COMMUNITIES, MAKING THE CONNECTION 190-94 (1996)
(providing an index of over one-hundred "local programs" to protect Chesapeake Bay
water quality); Thompson, supra note 58, at 226-35 (describing the valuable role that
citizens have played as informants of environmental violations).
60 See generally Thompson, supra note 58, at 216-26 (describing in detail the valuable
role that citizens have played as monitors of violations of environmental laws and
regulations); see also infra note 126 and accompanying text. Citizens and environmental
nonprofit groups have also played a critical role in supplementing enforcement of
violations of water quality requirements imposed under the Clean Water Act through
citizen suits. See, e.g., Healy, supra note 5, at 453-59 (detailing the important role that
citizen suits play in supplementing government enforcement of Clean Water Act
requirements for protecting water quality).
61 See, e.g., Edith Chase, Letter to Ohio EPA on TMDL for Middle Cuyahoga River
(dated July 7, 1999) in OHIO EPA, MIDDLE CUYAHOGA RIVER TMDL REPORT app E
(1999) (relaying two century history of dams on the River relevant to whether and which
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only needed to resolve the many inevitable decisions that cannot be
adequately addressed with existing scientific and technical tools, but they
also bring to the process their own, unique sources of information and
ideas about how a waterbody might be repaired. Excluding their
participation runs the risk of missing out on valuable information or more
cost-effective ways to address a problem.62
Finally, a process that alienates and hence de-legitimizes
participation may suffer from public backlash on the one hand or citizen
apathy on the other,63 and a mismatch between public and regulatory
should be removed or repaired); see generally U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR, NATIONAL PARK
SERVICE, RIVERWORK BOOK 15-57 (emphasizing throughout the citizen guide how
citizens can best develop and advance their unique ideas, goals, and information for river
restoration). Citizens may also be best suited to recognize when additional, obtainable
information is needed about a pollution problem and to identify what that information
should include. See, e.g., Chase letter, supra (suggesting that citizen demands for more
information led the state to conduct a more comprehensive assessment).
62See JOHN C. PIERCE & NICHOLAS P. LOVRICH, JR., WATER RESOURCES, DEMOCRACY
AND THE TECHNICAL INFORMATION QUANDRY 166 (1986) (concluding based on
substantial empirical study of Washington State that although the public's opinions are
more frequently inconsistent in comparison with technocrats on water allocation issues,
"[u]nexpectedly, . . . in the public the ability to identify important water resource
problems is not systematically related to either familiarity with technical terms or the
knowledge of those terms."); Thompson, supra note 58, at 186 (arguing that "citizens
play at least three critical enforcement roles" in environmental law by filing their own
prosecutorial suits, by monitoring water quality on individual watersheds or
environments, and by reporting information that evidences violations). Involving the
public also provides enhanced access for greater stakeholder involvement in water quality
decisions. As the FACA group observes, "stakeholders will support governmental
decisions and take action to solve water quality problems most readily when they are
involved in the overall process." FACA REPORT, supra note 7, at 11.
63 See, e.g., John C. Pierce et al., Rational Participation and Public Involvement in Water
Resource Politics, in WATER POLITICS AND PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT 167, 176 (John C.
Pierce & Harvey R. Doerksen eds., 1976) (highlighting the importance of meaningful
avenues of participation (not purely symbolic opportunities), and concluding that if
rational participants do not perceive that their input has been taken seriously they will
"withdraw and devote their energies to more fruitful political avenues"); Wendy E.
Wagner, supra note 15, at 265 (citing literature documenting examples of public backlash
and citizen apathy arising from unaccountable environmental decision-making).
Experience also shows that the more citizens can participate in meaningful ways, the
more they learn about the environment and their local resources. See, e.g., CHESAPEAKE
BAY COMMUNITIES, supra note 59, at 161-76 (listing dozens of citizen and student
education programs on the Chesapeake Bay, while at the same time highlighting survey
results that report that nearly 90 percent of those living near the Bay support cleanup and
believe it is among the most important public and private sector priorities - and support
does not vary with distance from the Bay); U.S. EPA, A COMMITMENT TO WATERSHED
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goals.64 These adverse consequences may be particularly unfortunate in
the area of water quality, since the literature suggests that a large number
of citizens are eager to participate in these decisions.65 Indeed, citizen
PROTECTION: A REVIEW OF THE CLEAN LAKES PROGRAM 13-16, 27-28 (1993)
ereinafter CLEAN LAKES].
See, e.g., Harrigan-Lum & Lum, supra note 40, at 62 (observing that "[u]nless TMDL
preparation is more closely tied to restoration of waterways at the federal level, there will
continue to be inadequate public support for implementation of TMDLs, and monies
spent on TMDL preparation in Hawaii will accomplish little beyond satisfying federal
paperwork requirements."). Professor Flatt, for example, has documented significant, yet
often invisible areas of slippage occurring during the permitting and enforcement of the
Clean Water Act point source program. See Victor B. Flatt, A Dirty River Runs Through
It (The Failure of Enforcement in the Clean Water Act), 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1
(1997). While this slippage may ultimately be shown to reflect underlying public values,
the slippage is obscured by regulatory complexities and thus would seem to escape all but
the most aggressive forms of public oversight. Greater public awareness of the decisions
being made by administrative officials would thus seem to provide an essential and
potentially potent check on the exercise of this discretion by state officials. See id. at 28
(arguing that if the slippage in enforcement is a reflection of public values, "it should be
considered directly, rather than imposed indirectly through administrative action, where
the policy decision essentially is insulated from public participation and review."). In
detailing the reasons that water-quality based approaches embodied in the Clean Water
Act have failed, Professor Healy also identifies a number of largely invisible sources of
administrative discretion that, taken cumulatively, help to explain the failure of the
TMDL and related programs. See Healy, supra note 5, at 416-29 (identifying EPA's
delays in promulgating regulations and its permissive or vague requirements for point
source discharge permits as several important sources of slippage that contribute to
failure of the water quality protection programs under the Clean Water Act).
Professors Gutmarn and Thompson also suggest that reciprocity can emerge out
of public deliberations, in which discussants better understand and respect different moral
judgments; the result also helps provide decisionmakers with a clearer understanding of
the issues at stake. See, e.g., AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND
DISAGREEMENT 2-3 (1996) (observing that "the possibility of any morally acceptable
resolution depends on citizens reasoning beyond their narrow self-interest and
considering what can be justified to people who reasonably disagree with them" and
concluding that based on the case studies detailed in their book, the fact that "some
citizens and some officials make arguments consistent with reciprocity suggests that a
deliberative perspective is not utopian."); id. at 196 (arguing that in an EPA effort to
engage citizens in decisions regarding emissions limits for an important local industry, if
"policymakers use utilitarianism as their sovereign principle, they are likely to ignore or
distort the meaning of some legitimate claims that citizens make.").
65 See, e.g., DAVID M. BOLLING, HOW TO SAVE A RIVER: A HANDBOOK FOR CITIZEN
ACTION 240 (1994) (observing that "[t]here are more than 2000 citizen groups scattered
all over the country organized to protect rivers and watersheds. There may be more than
100,000 people actively working on behalf of their rivers. That constitutes a movement,
and it is growing."); CLEAN LAKES, supra note 63, at 3 (noting the growing interest of
citizens in assisting with water quality problems and reporting that 30,000 copies of an
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involvement in water quality plans may ultimately serve to speed rather
than slow the process.
Given the benefits of participation, it is not surprising that
evidence of the few successes and many failures of water quality control
programs may actually correlate directly with the degree to which the
public was involved in the decision-making process.67 The success
EPA guidance manual on lake and reservoir restoration, written for a citizen audience,
have been distributed); see also NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION infra note 98. Thus,
current literature refutes the assumption by some that greater avenues for citizen
involvement are not necessary because citizens "do not care." See also CHESAPEAKE BAY
COMMUNITIES, supra note 59, at 161 (detailing very high (nearly 90 percent) citizen
concern over cleanup of Chesapeake Bay, even for citizens who do not live within 100
miles of the Bay); Final TMDL Regulations, supra note 11, at 43589 (reporting that
during the extended notice and comment period on the proposed TMDL rule, the agency
received "about 34,000 comments on the proposal comprised of about 30,500 postcards,
2,700 letters making one or two points, and 780 detailed comments addressing many
issues.").
66 See infra note 98 and accompanying text; cf Adler, supra note 1, at 1002 (observing
how greater citizen involvement in watershed projects and the related "sense of 'place'
can also be used to provide public support for funding, strengthen water resource
protection and restoration programs, and encourage citizens to devote personal time to
grass-roots watershed restoration."); but see Daniel A. Mazmanian, Participatory
Democracy in a Federal Agency, in WATER POLITICS AND PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT, supra
note 63, at 201, 204-06 (describing the theoretical and empirical development of the
participation hypothesis (that participation is necessary for social change), but cautioning
that when irreconcilable conflicts in goals and values (a circumstance that is not at all
inevitable in water quality planning) are present participation is unlikely to bear fruit).
But see GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 64, at 2 (challenging this position by
arguing that their case studies reveal that reciprocity in deliberations is not utopian and
works to elevate and advance moral disagreements).
67 See, e.g., CLEAN LAKES, supra note 63, at 1-8, 20-35 (1993) (discussing with
numerous case studies how local commitment to clean lakes equates to success);
Anderson, supra note 2, at 378 (concluding with respect to a pilot participation project on
the Neponset River Watershed, that "[t]he public meetings and education events
involving a broad range of interested individuals and groups from within the watershed
resulted in several small successes, as well as several large victories for water resource
protection."); Houck IV, supra note 9, at 10486 (observing that at bottom it is the citizen
volunteer groups that "in the best tradition of participatory democracy, advance the goals
of law through the use of law, and no better illustration of the need for these groups exists
than in the history of TMDLs."); see also Adler, supra note 1, at 1097-98 (citing
successful examples of citizen participation in watershed protection and restoration
projects); Anderson, supra note 2, at 372-77 (discussing progress of water quality
controls in Chesapeake Bay, Puget Sound, and Long Island, which attempt to solicit
citizen input to varying degrees, but not offering any correlation between public
participation and the ultimate success of the programs).
For a more general account of the benefits (and promising paths) for better
public deliberation over difficult social problems, see generally GUTMANN & THOMPSON,
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stories-when pollution was reduced beyond the level set by technology-
based standards-are almost all accomplished in watersheds where the
general public led the battle. 68 The clean up of the Chesapeake Bay,
which is undoubtedly the greatest success story, has been characterized by
"massive amounts of public participation," some of which predates
passage of the Clean Water Act in 1972.69 And while scientific research
has played a central role in identifying the primary pollutants adversely
affecting the Bay's water quality, strong public support and participation
was essential to ensuring that the research was done and that it answered
70relevant policy questions. Public values have also proven essential on
the many occasions that scientific uncertainties prevented a technical
answer from emerging on how best to protect the Bay's water quality. For
example, one of the most significant advances in cleaning up the Bay was
a "seat of the pants" decision by affected states and other participants to
reduce the loading of key nutrients into the Bay by 40 percent by the year
2000.71 Conversely, in most states that have not made progress in
supra note 64 (in chapter 5, for example, the authors analyze EPA Administrator
Ruckleshaus' successful effort to generate public deliberation over the appropriate
emissions limits on an industry that emitted high levels of arsenic into the air, but that
also provided the local community with jobs; the authors also underscore the benefits of
deliberation, irrespective of whether or how quickly social outcomes are reached).
68 Citizens have not only advanced the cause of better water quality through voluntary
initiatives and activities, but some grassroots groups have been at the cutting edge of the
recent TMDL litigation that served to awaken a sleeping program See, e.g., Houck II,
supra note 9, at 10397 (observing that until the last few years, EPA's TMDL program
"was basically driven by lawsuits, court orders, and consent decrees [from a series of
citizen suits filed against EPA and the states].").
69 Adler, supra note 1, at 1072; see also CHESAPEAKE BAY COMMUNITIES, MAKING THE
CONNECTION 2 (1996) (hailing the Chesapeake Bay Program as "a national and
international model for estuarine restoration and watershed protection . . . [that
constitutes] a unique, regional, federal-state-local partnership.").70 See, e.g., William Eichbaum, The Chesapeake Bay: Major Research Program Leads to
Innovative Implementation, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. 10237, 10238-39 (1984) (detailing the
important role the public and elected officials played in securing a commitment to do
additional research on the Bay, and in ensuring that the research remained relevant to the
pressing policy questions).
I See, e.g., CHESAPEAKE BAY COMMUNITIES, supra note 69, at 2 (highlighting the
significance of the 1987 Chesapeake Bay Agreement, which codified the 40 percent goal
for reduction of nitrogen and phosphorous by the year 2000); see also id. at 37 (observing
that "[t]he watershed management approach is characterized by being action oriented,
driven by broad environmental objectives, and involving key stakeholders."); see also
Marianne D. Mason, Saving the Chesapeake Bay, One Gazebo at a Time, 14 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T 134, 137 (1999) (describing how the Maryland legislature drew "a
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repairing degraded waters, opportunities for public participation appear to
be minimal, despite the presence of interested citizens and grassroots
organizations who may desire to play a meaningful role in the decision-
making process. Although states and the EPA do not collect data on how
little the public participates or understands their TMDL programs, some
indirect measures are available. In Ohio, for example, where little
progress on the TMDL process has been made,72 the public has been
largely silent throughout the water quality march, at times against their
wishes. 73  Similar patterns appear in other low-ranking state TMDL
programs.
74
Ill. CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IS DISCOURAGED BY THE WATER QUALITY
MARCH
Given the importance of public participation to resolving how best
to improve water quality, one would expect the legal requirements to be
developed in such a way as to facilitate these types of public discussions.
This is not the case with the TMDL program, however. The water quality
'line in the sand' at 100 feet from the shoreline" to prohibit development (with a few
narrow exceptions) in order to protect the Bay from erosion and nonpoint source runoff).
72 See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
73 See, e.g., Ohio EPA Division of Surface Water, Responsiveness Summary for
Comments Received on the Clean Water Act - Section 303(d) List, State of Ohio - FFY
1999-2000 Draft Report 2-3 (Apr. 10, 1998) (responding to multiple concerns by
approximately 50 percent of total commentors that opportunities for public participation
and education were inadequate by insisting that the prioritization process met "the
minimum requirements" of the law); see also id. at 3 (conceding that "[u]ntil 1998, Ohio
EPA submitted its TMDL list to the U.S. EPA with little or no public comment or
articipation.").
4 In their recent study of the states' TMDL programs, the National Wildlife Federation
concluded that with respect to the "opportunities for the public to participate in the
TMDL process, none of the states received a top score.... Common problems resulting
in low scores included lack of a TMDL advisory committee with public representation,
inadequate publication of hearings or opportunities for comment, inadequate responses to
public comments, and lists that were difficult to interpret." POLLUTION PARALYSIS II,
supra note 37, at 16. The criteria used to evaluate opportunities for public participation,
moreover, included only basic features, such as whether the state had established an
advisory committee on TMDLs that solicited adequate input from citizens; the notices on
opportunities for public input were adequately publicized; public participation was
provided at all stages of list development; the state responded to comments; basic
documents were available to the public; and the states' lists were "user-friendly." Id. at
83. Interestingly, based on their application of these criteria to Ohio, the State ranked just
above the average in participation and earned a "C" on its overall TMDL program, a
ranking that was also above average in comparison to the other states. Id. at 16, 65.
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march is laden with features that cumulatively serve to increase the costs
of participating, while at the same time artificially reducing the perceived
benefits of that participation in ways that likely discourage all but the most
sophisticated or well-financed individual or groups from becoming
involved. These features, in fact, help to explain why the program has
floundered in the past and may continue to flounder in the future, even as
more demanding federal requirements are established.
In this section, the adverse impacts of the water quality march on
public participation are detailed. First, a formula is advanced that
provides a crude mechanism for assessing how amenable a regulatory
program is to public participation. This formula is then used to uncover a
variety of obstacles to public participation and deliberation imposed by the
water quality march. Each of these obstacles appear either to be
unnecessary or to have assumed a role out of proportion to what is needed.
A. The Participatory Formula
The extent to which a regulatory program is amenable to public
participation can be determined in an approximate way by considering the
costs that the program imposes on the would-be participant. Neil Komesar
models this quite simply in cost/benefit terms using the participant-
centered model developed in his path-breaking book, Imperfect
Alternatives.75 Professor Komesar argues that individuals participate in
transactions, whether they be market or political, based on whether there
are net benefits to participating. The extent of an individual's
participation, Komesar argues, is based simply on the difference between
the benefits that will accrue to the person by participating and the costs of
participation. 76  The remarkable simplicity and resiliency of this
conceptual model provides an invaluable tool for assessing the extent to
which citizens will be involved in any given policy-making endeavor.
Although the costs and benefits of participation for any individual
include both internally 77 and externally imposed costs, only the externally
75 See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 7 (1994) (introducing the "participation-centered
agproach" as an analytical framework).
See id. at 8 ("The character of institutional participation is determined by the
interaction between the benefits of that participation and the costs of that participation.").
77 The fear of angering neighbors or employers, the opportunity costs of pursuing other
activities, and the increased costs of local produce. or other goods that might result were
pollution regulations more strictly enforced are all costs that a citizen may consider in
their decision whether to engage in issues affecting water quality.
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imposed costs will be considered in this analysis.78 Since these costs are
imposed on the citizen from "the outside," rather than coming from the
citizen's own value system, the regulatory process can be implicated as a
possible cause of lowered participation.
B. Assessing how Amenable the Water Quality March is to Public
Participation
A cost accounting reveals that the water quality march
unnecessarily inflates the costs of public participation while
simultaneously giving lay citizens the misimpression that their input has
little value to the policy effort, which artificially lowers the perceived
benefits to participating. Both the inflated costs and artificially reduced
benefits to participation are considered in turn. 
79
1. Inflated Costs that Impede Citizen Participation
Participating in any regulatory exercise, even one that addresses a
local or regional resource, will require citizens to incur costs. These
inevitable costs include the costs of accessing and digesting available
information, the costs of attending hearings or other public deliberations,
and the costs of consulting with other lay participants in the process or
those with needed legal or scientific expertise.
Yet when one considers the implementation of the water quality
march by the states and the EPA, it becomes apparent that many of these
inevitable costs become inflated well beyond what is necessary. One
factor that inflates the costs of participation arises from the tendency of the
EPA and the states to mire their water quality programs in technical
equations, without corresponding attention to highlighting the multiple
uncertainties that characterize water quality science and thus require the
7K There is admittedly some inextricable relation between internal costs and benefits to
participating and the external framing and education regarding these issues. Cf.
BOLLING, supra note 65, at 59 (instructing activists to create an "image for the river [that
they wish to protect] that communicates something appealing, important, and
threatened."). This area of interaction is put to one side for purposes of the analysis.
79 Professor Komesar identifies as the primary categories of costs of participation those
related to the cost of information and the cost of organization. Within the cost of
information, Komesar includes "the complexity or difficulty of understanding the issue in
question, the numbers of people on one side or the other of the interest in question, and
the formal barriers to access associated with institutional rules and procedures."
KOMESAR, supra note 75, at 8.
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infusion of public values.80  By portraying watershed management and
related pollution control tools as scientific exercises and by making little
effort to "decode" the technical language, particularly with respect to the
rampant uncertainties and variability in the resulting measurements, the
costs of participation are raised substantially. 81 As a result, citizens must
dedicate weeks or even months or years of effort to acquire a basic
understanding of the basis for water quality standards, current water
quality, and the options for future water pollution control. 82 While self-
education on these issues is not impossible, the lay citizen must not only
invest time and sometimes money in accessing pertinent data, but must
also have the confidence to challenge technical experts to ensure that their
s0 The states have been criticized for failing to be forthright about problems and gaps in
their water quality data, for example. See, e.g., PEER, supra note 33 (detailing a number
of misleading practices in water quality data collection and analysis by the states and the
EPA that escape notice by the public or Congress). The EPA's orientation is also
decidedly technical. In its recent final TMDL regulations (and despite commentors'
concerns that it would limit flexibility), the EPA added the word "quantitative" to "clarify
that the TMDL must contain a quantified plan for allocating pollutant loads to attain and
maintain water quality standards." Final TMDL Regulations, supra note 11, at 43595,
43629. The EPA also specifies the limited ways that these quantified limits can be
expressed. Id. at 43628-29 (four approaches to expressing TMDL). In addition,
according to Professor Houck, U.S. EPA has developed "a 'watershed academy'
featuring 23 separate courses beginning with 'Watersheds 101' and a web of assessment
systems entitled 'BASINS,' featuring national databases, assessment tools .... local data
inputs, water quality models .... and 'post processing output tools for interpreting model
results."' Houck IV, supra note 9, at 10477.
81 The TMDL process tends to be framed explicitly as a "science-based" approach to
water quality protection. See, e.g., WASHINGTON STATE DEPT. OF ECOLOGY, GUIDANCE
DOCUMENT FOR DEVELOPING TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOADS (TMDLs): WATER
CLEANUP PLANS, Pub. No. 99-23-WQ at 1 (Sept. 1999). In this technical exercise, the
public is generally situated as the recipient of information and technical calculations upon
which they may have a single opportunity to comment (or be educated), rather than the
originator of the underlying values and goals that drive the process. See, e.g., id. at app.
B. The agency staff, by contrast, originate and devise much of the substance of the water
Vality march for each waterbody. See id.
Citizen guides are available to assist citizens with this basic education, but they are not
easy reading. See, e.g., OHIO EPA DIVISION OF SURFACE WATER, A GUIDE TO
DEVELOPING LOCAL WATERSHED ACTION PLANS IN OHIO 4 (1997) (detailing the rather
daunting and tedious details involved in planning and implementing a watershed plan);
see also id. at 17, warning citizens that:
Trying to interpret the Water Resource Inventory can be a difficult, if
not intimidating task. This section will give you the basics to navigate
your way through the 305(b) report; however, to fully utilize the report
and better understand the ecology of your watershed, you may wish to
thoroughly read Volume 1: Summary, Status and Trends.
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explanations are based either on specific scientific facts or accessible
policy judgments. 83  To the extent that decisions are portrayed as
scientifically ordained when in fact they are not, then lay efforts to
participate in public decisions regarding water quality become still more
time-consuming and unsettling.84
The costs of participation are not only increased by unnecessarily
complicating the substance of the policy decision, but also by fragmenting
the authority to resolve it. Under the current regulatory regime, dozens of
water pollution control programs have been established as essentially
separate and independent programs. 85  To participate in water quality
programs, then, a citizen must first understand the technology-based
standards in the NPDES program, the water quality standards and
designated use programs, and the individual control strategy and total
maximum daily load programs. If wetlands are involved in the water
quality picture, still another regulatory 8lprogram-run by a totally different
federal agency-must be consulted. °  Not only is this fragmentation
horizontal, but it is also vertical. 87 One citizens' guide offers would-be lay
;3 See infra note 99. For example, in the Ohio TMDL for the Middle Cuyahoga River,
not only do hypertechnical charts and projections form the exclusive substance of the
report, but the uncertainties in the data and projections are not highlighted or quantified.
Instead, point estimates (without corresponding error bars) give citizens the impression
that the technical information was decisive on what sorts of modifications are necessary
to attain, for example, "the Warmwater Habitat Aquatic Life Use" goal. See, e.g., OHIO
EPA DIVISION OF SURFACE WATER, TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOADS FOR THE MIDDLE
CUYAHOGA RIVER: FINAL REPORT at 10, tbl. 2 (1999); id. at 19-21, tbls. 3 through 5.
84 See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 15, at 193-95 (describing the challenges involved for a
lay person attempting to identify uncertainties and buried assumptions in the
methodology or other features of a scientific study). Indeed, if scientifically validated
answers did lie at the end of the water quality march, it might be a much easier
garticipatory exercise, since the results would match the expectations.
See, e.g., BOLLING, supra note 65, at 145-97 (identifying the various legal tools
available to save a river, each of which overlap but are implemented in very distinct
ways); Adler, supra note 1, at 993-94 (observing the substantial fragmentation of water
resource issues with a number of "entities designed to address only a single water
resource issue, or single-purpose entities that have evolved to 'address' multiple uses and
purposes, but that are still driven by single-minded goals," and also noting the
"competition rather than cooperation" that has typified this multiple-agency approach).
86 See, e.g., BOLLING, supra note 65, at 155-60 (attempting to summarize these features
of the Clean Water Act for interested citizens in a five page summary).
87 See, e.g., Adler, supra note 1, at 992 (observing that "both across and within the
various levels of government, responsibility for water resources is divided among a
multitude of agencies and entities. According to one estimate, there are well over
100,000 public entities involved in water resources in the United States."); Anderson,
supra note 2, at 367 (observing that "[o]n the federal level, thirteen congressional
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participants a list of government agency contacts involved in watershed
restoration in an appendix.88 That appendix lists not only lists forty-four
discrete programs administered by five federal agencies, but it also
identifies eighteen possible state agencies, two regional, and eight local
authorities, all of which may have separate as well as overlapping
responsibilities for some facet of a state's water quality control program.
89
A third factor that inflates the cost of citizen participation is the
sheer volume of material that must be reviewed. To participate, a citizen
must often access voluminous files, only a few of which are likely to be
readily accessible (through the internet for example). 9° In the State of
Ohio, for example, the sources and types of water quality data available on
a waterbody are provided in six separate programs and must be accessed
through at least four separate agency programs.91 If a citizen also seeks
hydrologic information on groundwater and physical characteristics of the
watershed, there are at least twenty-four additional types of documentary
information available, usually located in a number of different
governmental agencies and academic and nonprofit institutions.
92
The final cost involves acquiring the legal expertise with which to
navigate the legal requirements. 93 Citizens must learn the points at which
they can participate most meaningfully in the process, as well as how best
to communicate their views and values so that policymakers will take
committees, eight cabinet agencies, six independent regulatory agencies, and the White
House are involved in water policy planning. At the state level, more than 300
departments exist to regulate water use and pollution. Also, poor water quality... [is]
regulated by local government.").
88 See TERRENE INSTITUTE, CLEAN WATER IN YOUR WATERSHED: A CITIZENS GUIDE TO
WATERSHED PROTECTION 67-79 (1993) (listing in a thirteen page appendix the various
federal, state, regional, and local agencies that are involved in "watershed restoration and
pollution control," as well as identifying the separate programs within a single agency
like the EPA).
89 Id.
90 Cf. NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, supra note 61, at 3-12 (1988) (advising citizens
interested in protecting a river how to focus their information gathering to a manageable
level).
91 See, e.g., OHIO EPA DIVISION OF SURFACE WATER, supra note 82, at 15-17.
92 Id. at 21-22, 25, and 27.
93 See, e.g., Luke W. Cole, Macho Law Brains, Public Citizens, and Grassroots
Activities: Three Models of Environmental Advocacy, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 687, 699
(1995) (outlining three models of environmental advocacy, all of which emphasize the
significant information base required to participate, particularly the "power model" which
"relies on a step-by-step analysis of the power dynamics of the decision.").
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them seriously.94 In some instances, for example, persons interested in a
water quality decision may take the time and effort to attend and even
speak at a public hearing, but may not understand the importance of also
filing more detailed written comments, with supporting documentation. 95
The legal "soft spots" in a state's TMDL program (e.g., when critical
decisions become invisible or their consequences drastically understated)
may also escape those citizens who haven't invested considerable time in
understanding the complex law and regulations. For example, some states
de-list degraded waters as soon as a TMDL plan is in place, causing that
waterbody to fall off of the radar screens of watchful citizens. 96 Without
training, however, this regulatory maneuver would likely escape notice by
most citizens and citizen groups.97
Of course, some of these costs can be reduced by sharing them
with others. In fact, the dramatic growth of grassroots organizations,
formed in communities concerned about a particular river or waterbody,
may be a testament to the extent of citizen effort dedicated to overcoming
94 See BOLLING, supra note 65, at 99-141 (dedicating a forty-two page chapter to "inside"
advice on how to work with and, if necessary, successfully combat opposition in a
rassroots effort to save a river).
See, e.g., OHIO EPA DIVISION OF SURFACE WATER, supra note 83, at 23 (observing
that at a hearing attended by 120 citizens, "[t]he majority of the comments received and
the responses given by Ohio EPA in regards to the Middle Cuyahoga TMDL... have
been verbal. Three written comments were received and are included in Appendix E.").
96 See, e.g., NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, SAVING OUR WATERSHEDS: A FIELD
GUIDE TO WATERSHED RESTORATION USING TMDLS 15 (1998) (describing how some
states de-list degraded waters once a TMDL is in place and detailing the adverse
consequences that flow from such an action).
97See, e.g., Cole, supra note 93, at 699 (mapping the participatory approaches available
to citizens for opposing the siting of an unwanted facility, and emphasizing the numerous
detailed choices that can arise, including the overarching decision of which of three
participatory strategies to adopt). Effluent trading as a way to reach water quality goals
also poses particular dangers with respect to ensuring meaningful opportunities for public
involvement. Cf. Richard Toshiyuki Drury et al., Pollution Trading and Environmental
Injustice: Los Angeles' Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y F. 231, 278-79 (1999) (reporting that under Los Angeles' smog market [for air
pollutants], pollution trades "are not subject to public review or comment. In fact, the
public faces numerous difficulties finding out what companies are trading to avoid
compliance with pollution control standards."). Additional measures should be
implemented to ensure participation when market-trading schemes are implemented. See,
e.g., Mark Van Putten, Comments by the National Wildlife Federation on the U.S.
E.P.A. 's Draft Framework for Watershed-Based Trading, at 5 (Sept. 11, 1996) at http://
www.epa.gov/OWOW/watershed/tradecom/level3/nwf.htmJ (last visited Feb. 12, 2000)
(recommending various protections to ensure that citizens are able to oversee trading and
monitor its progress in meeting water quality goals).
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current participatory barriers to water quality decision-making. 98  Yet
again, in order to organize, one or more citizen leaders must invest
considerable up-front costs to get others engaged. If a citizen leader does
not have a sophisticated knowledge of the legal and technical intricacies of
water quality control, then these costs will be quite high and will include
not only the costs of locating the rules, agency staff, and implemented
policies, but also the costs of gaining the expertise to know what to look
for and to be able to interpret and analyze the information that is found.99
After citizen leaders gather this information, they must then incur
additional costs to catalyze others into action. I10 The ability to simplify
and explain complicated legal and scientific concepts and the ability to
motivate others into action are both qualities that someone must possess in
the grassroots organization. Thus, public discourse over how best to
improve the environmental quality of local resources may become a
serendipitous event. If an energetic or sophisticated leader is present in a
community, citizen voices may be heard.101 If not, the process may
98 See, e.g., Clean Water Network directory (list of organizations that are members), at
http://www.cwn.org/docs/geninfo/netlink.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2000); see also Adler,
supra note 1, at 1000-01 (observing the "groundswell of... 'river-oriented community
revitalization projects' lauded by citizen activists."); Houck IV, supra note 9, at 10485
(describing the growth of grassroots groups that have formed to protect water quality);
see generally NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, supra note 96 (guide to help citizens
navigate the TMDL process). The number of grassroots water quality organizations has
apparently climbed into the thousands and has even generated demand for super-
organizations that serve as the central authority and clearinghouse for issues of interest to
its grassroots members. See, e.g., Clean Water Network home page, at http://www.
cwn.org/homepage.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2000) (describing the Clean Water Network
as "an alliance of more than 1000 organizations that endorse its platform paper.., which
outlines the need for strong clean water safeguards to protect human health and the
environment."); River Network home page, at http://www.rivemetwork.org/contribu.htm
(last visited Sept. 3, 2000) (describing the River Network as dedicated to protecting and
preserving "America's rivers and watersheds through building a grassroots, national
movement.").
99See, e.g., BOLLING, supra note 65, at 36-37 (highlighting that technical experts "are
absolutely essential ingredients for most successful river campaigns .... So if you don't
have the expertise, you'll have to go out and find it.").
100 See generally BOLLING, supra note 65, at 7 (warning readers that "[a]s ... every...
successful river saver makes clear, you can't save a river by yourself-you need
partners.").
0 See, e.g., JOHN CRONIN & ROBERT F. KENNEDY, JR., THE RIVERKEEPERS 22-49
(1997) (describing the pivotal role played by one charismatic citizen, Robert H. Boyle, in
establishing "Riverkeepers," a grassroots citizen organization that has made tremendous
strides in combating a number of sources of pollution in the Hudson River); cf Daniel A.
Mazmanian & Jeanne Nienaber, Prospects for Public Participation in Federal Agencies:
The Case of the Army Corps of Engineers, in WATER POLITICS AND PUBLIC
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proceed with little to no connection to the citizenry, despite the fact that
the current and future fate of public resources is being decided. °2
2. Artificially Reduced Benefits for Citizen Participation
Costs alone do not determine participation. If the benefits or stakes of
participation are great, a citizen or citizens will persevere as long as the
benefits of participation outweigh the costs. Of course, individual benefits
of participation will vary tremendously between people and organizations,
and participation levels are likely to vary for this reason. If individual
perceptions of the benefits of participating are influenced by external
factors such as the regulatory process, however, it is another matter
entirely. In this case participation will be based not on an assessment of
actual benefits, but on a distorted perception that is not accurate. Yet it
appears that the water quality march has precisely this sort of adverse
impact on participation because it artificially lowers the perceived benefits
of participating.
Rather than being cast as a program in desperate need of public input,
water quality programs are framed in ways that minimize the importance
of the citizen's perceived (or real) role.'0 3 There are at least three features
that may cause citizens to underestimate the value of their contribution to
water quality control programs. The first is the technical framing of the
INVOLVEMENT, supra note 63, at 225, 245 (concluding from their study of public
participation in the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers that the Corps' [new participation-
friendly] program is evidence that the
problems of freeriding and collective action can be overcome, to some
extent, if an agency is willing to underwrite information gathering and
organizational costs that have usually served to impede participation in
the public policy process by all but the well-organized, wealthy, and
102 development oriented.)See, e.g., infra note 111 (discussing stakeholder groups as a surrogate for broader
efforts to include the public in decision-making).
103 In fact, some states appear to exacerbate the hostility of their programs to public
participation, either by actively excluding opportunities for comment or denying
reasonable requests for more time. See, e.g., NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, supra
note 96, at 39 (reporting that
Some states do not adequately notify the public. They provide the
minimal amount of public participation by simply publishing a public
notice in the legal notice section of the newspapers . . . . Another
problem is that both the listing and TMDL development processes can
be technical, which makes it difficult for citizens to participate
effectively.);
see also infra notes 111-13.
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problem mentioned previously. Not only does misframing the problem as
a technical one raise the cost of participation, but this misframing also
gives citizens the impression that the problems are best resolved by
technocrats and other experts. 0 4 Unless citizens have stubbornly invested
the time and resources to learn otherwise, or have an advanced education
that allows them to penetrate this technocratic insulation, they will likely
walk away from opportunities to deliberate on vital public decisions about
water quality control. '05 They will perceive that their input is superfluous,
or nearly so, with respect to the "scientific" issues under discussion.
Second, water quality plans have been fractured into micro-issues that
take years to coalesce into anything approaching a significant policy
decision. 106  In setting enforceable standards for nonpoint and point
sources that are discharging problem pollutants into degraded waters, for
example, a protracted process must be followed for each pollutant, usually
on separate segments of each stream. 107 A designated use is identified for
104 The misframing of water quality problems as an issue largely resolved with scientific
analysis has also been used by opponents of more stringent water quality controls. These
opponents argue that regulatory controls cannot be imposed unless they are justified by
"good science." See, e.g., ASSOCIATION OF METROPOLITAN SEWERAGE AGENCIES,
EVALUATING TMDLs... PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF POTWs (revised 2000) at http://
www.amsa-cleanwater.org/tmdl/tmdl.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2000) (identifying in the
executive summary that one of the main lines of attack that publicly owned treatment
works (POTWs) can launch against TMDLs that propose stringent effluent limits is
whether "there is sufficient reliable scientific data" to support the state's plan; more
specific recommendations on the good science approach to questioning TMDLs are
identified in subsequent chapters); Houck IV, supra note 9, at 10476 (reporting on how
some groups oppose a state's list of degraded waters as "based on inadequate science
("drive-by listings," in the words of one agriculture industry attorney... )."). In other
words, the statutory program's unrealistic demands for technical rigor have been used by
some to reverse the burden of proof for water quality controls. They argue that the
regulators must scientifically establish that there is a problem before precautionary action
can be taken.
105 See, e.g., Mauk Mulder, Power Equalization Through Participation?, 16 ADMIN. SCI.
Q. 31 (1971) (reporting that citizens are more likely to participate when they are both
interested in an issue and feel that they can contribute meaningfully to it).
106 See generally Adler, supra note 9, at 267 (observing that "'comprehensive' planning
under the CWA has proceeded, either sequentially or simultaneously, under at least seven
separate statutory programs.") After receiving negative comments on its proposal that
TMDLs be completed by a state within fifteen years (or by the year 2015), the EPA
revised its final rule to require that TMDLs be promulgated by the year 2010 with an
added good faith five-year extension available. See Final TMDL Regulations, supra note
11, section 130.28(b), at 43666; see also preamble at 43613 (discussing this change in the
deadlines).
107 See, e.g., Final TMDL Regulation, supra note 11, at 43621-27, 43667-69 (describing
the eleven mandatory elements of a TMDL set forth in section 130.32, and noting that the
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the waterbody; water quality standards are set to match the designated use;
monitoring data is gathered for the waterbody; priorities among degraded
waters are set; and allocations for pollutant reductions on that waterbody
are determined. The resulting water quality march takes years or even
decades to complete, with many of the individual steps completely
disconnected from one another in both time and substance. The
fractionation of the decision-making process into micro-steps thus causes
each step of the decision to become so insignificant or minor from the
standpoint of the citizen that only the affected sources are likely to find it
worthwhile to invest the time and resources required to participate in the
process.'08 In a recent Ohio TMDL decision for the "Middle Cuyahoga
River," in fact, a number of the 120 citizens present at the only public
hearing held on that project complained that only one segment of the
eleventh element (an implementation plan) contains its own set of eight required
elements). Further fractionating the process is the EPA's requirement that states first
submit a comprehensive "methodology" for developing their list of impaired waters, a
methodology upon which the public is asked to comment separately, yet which guides all
future decisions. The EPA also presents the methodology as exclusively, or at least
predominantly based on technical and quantitative criteria, although it does acknowledge
the role of qualitative considerations (such as aesthetics and recreation) in developing the
schedule of priorities. Id. at 43665, 43666 (section 130.23 lists the substantive
requirements for this methodology; section 130.28(e) lists "other [qualitative] factors"
that may be considered in scheduling waterbodies for TMDL establishment). One set of
authors observe that, at least in Hawaii, the TMDL's narrow focus only on the loading of
particular pollutants has caused the public to be less interested in TMDLs since it ignores
related public objectives for water quality (such as "restoration of aesthetic qualities,
habitat, and water quantity."). See Harrigan-Lum & Lum, supra note 40, at 61
(observing that "[a]lthough community interest is high in terms of support for improving
both the appearance and water quality in listed waters .... The narrow focus of the
TMDL program on material pollutants and temperature has not generated widespread
public interest in Hawaii; much more public emphasis is being given to broader issues of
[stream restoration]."); see also Adler, supra note 9, at 268-69 (criticizing this single-
ollutant approach of the TMDL process).0 The fractionated decision-making process thus reduces the benefits of participating
unless the participant knows that he or she can maintain continuity in the decision-
making process for years or even decades. Not only are the costs of participating raised
(because of the time commitment), but the perceived benefits are reduced to the extent
that one can only be assured their participation in one or even a few micro-points within
the transaction. While the EPA defines a TDML "to apply to one pollutant in a
waterbody," it does not foreclose the ability of states to establish TMDLs for a larger
watershed or for several pollutants at one time. Final TMDL Regulations, supra note 11,
at 43596. The EPA appears to have added this flexibility only after soliciting comments
and expressing concern over the extent to which this flexibility might cause states to
"depart too far from their priority rankings." Proposed Revisions to the Water Quality
Planning and Management Regulation, 64 Fed. Reg. 46012, 46028 (1999) [hereinafter
"Proposed TMDL Rule"].
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infamous Cuyahoga River (the river that burned) was under discussion,
rather than the larger polluted watershed. 10 9 Indeed, had the citizens
consulted the State of Ohio's prioritization list, they would have
discovered that similar proceedings were planned for 880 other water
segments in the state, each with a possible total of twenty-nine separate
impairments, some of which will be addressed separately on a pollutant by
pollutant basis (totaling 2366 impairments state-wide)., 10
Third, and more subtly, citizens may correctly intuit that the value
of their participation is discounted by the agency and is viewed as being
less valuable than the input of other, more sophisticated or influential
participants."' At least one preliminary study has shown that agencies
treat citizen input as being less important than input provided by
industry.112 At times, the state may, reinforce this impression by restricting
avenues for public participation. 11
109See OHIO EPA DIVISION OF SURFACE WATER, supra note 83, at 23 ("Concern was
expressed [at the public hearing] that the Middle Cuyahoga River was singled out for
some reason and that the entire Cuyahoga River watershed should have been addressed in
this TMDL.").
110 See EPA, Ohio 303(d) List Fact Sheet, supra note 53.
I This impression that citizen input is discounted is exacerbated by the tendency of
many states to convene "stakeholder groups" essentially in lieu of holding open meetings
and information sessions. See, e.g., NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, supra note 96, at
20-21 (reporting that states commonly convene stakeholders to determine how best to
allocate pollution loads). From these stakeholder groups, a citizen may get the
impression that there are two levels of participants-those who are consulted by the
agency and those who are not. Obviously the composition of these stakeholder groups is
also of concern in ensuring that the citizen input that is heard is balanced and
representative of the community views. See NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, supra
note 96, at 21 (identify'ing as a problem the fact that "[s]takeholder groups are often
heavily weighted with industry representatives."); OHIO EPA, MIDDLE CUYAHOGA
TMDL REPORT at App. E (Dec. 1999) (detailing state's efforts at public outreach, most
of which consisted of holding meetings with listed stakeholders, nearly all of whom were
affiliated with states, municipal organizations, or local government-only three of the
forty-two stakeholders were unaffiliated or represented a citizen group) (appendix on file
with author); see also infra note 133 (discussing why state officials may not be receptive
topublic input).
See Ann Bray, Comment, Scientific Decision Making: A Barrier to Citizen
Participation in Environmental Agency Decision Making, 17 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
1111, 1129 (1991) (agency staff in Minnesota EPA interviewed with regard to their
acceptance of commentors' scientific data revealed that 48 percent of staff believed
industry data was reasonably accurate, while only 3 percent of staff believed same for
citizen data).
113 See, e.g., D. Brennen Keene, Comment, The Inconsistency of Virginia's Execution of
the NPDES Permit Program: The Foreclosure of Citizen Attorneys General from State
and Federal Courts, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 715, 734 (1995) (describing how the Virginia
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3. Summary
In sum, both inflated costs and artificially reduced benefits
associated with the TMIDL process serve to limit citizens' participation.
This result of the current regulatory process, in fact, may be no accident.
Those with the greatest resources and technical sophistication may be
content with (or even aggravate) the extent to which the process alienates
those with fewer resources for participation. 114
IV. REFORM
Many of the failings of the current TMDL program are forgivable.
Like a number of other regulatory programs, the technical detail and
bureaucratic requirements have been incorporated into the TMDL program
for good reason: during the first twenty years after this program was
passed into law, states were given full reign in incorporating watershed
management tools into water quality control plans and accomplished little.
The TMDL technical requirements appear, therefore, to be necessary for
some progress to be made." 5 The argument advanced here, however, is
legislature "grants standing to review [agency] decisions to issue or deny a [Clean Water
Act NPDES ] permit only to permit holders or applicants."); see also FACA REPORT,
supra note 7, at 68-69 (expressing Committee concern "that merely following the
minimum requirements for providing public notice of TMDL listing and development
decisions will fail to inform concerned citizens of opportunities to participate and will
cause agencies to lose valuable information, input, and cooperation from the public.");
see also supra note 73 (recounting State of Ohio's ambivalence about providing
meaningful avenues for public participation in response to a number of comments
criticizing Ohio's approach).
114 The high external costs and obstacles imposed on participants by features of the
TMDL process may coincidentally provide some predictive power as to whose voices
will be loudest and ever-present-those with scientific and legal sophistication;
organized; and abundant resources to attend to each and every micro-process. See
generally David Zaring, Note, Agriculture, Nonpoint Source Pollution, and Regulatory
Control: The Clean Water Act's Bleak Present and Future, 20 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv.
515 (1996) (discussing influence of agricultural interests in ensuring that nonpoint
requirements in the federal statutes are lax).
See, e.g., Lynda L. Butler, State Environmental Programs: A Study in Political
Influence and Regulatory Failure, 31 WM. & MARY L. REv. 823, 828 (1990) (detailing
the pervasive failure of state governments to take the initiative on environmental
regulation, and outlining political and internal legal explanations for this failure); Flatt,
supra note 64, at 33-34 (concluding based on detailed study of two state enforcement
programs that states cannot be trusted with unbridled discretion over enforcement of
environmental regulations, and that for enforcement of the Clean Water Act, "a true
change in state enforcement and thus control of pollution requires effective EPA
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that these TMDL requirements should be framed as the default (or after-
the-fact) requirements, and that alternatives allowing for greater citizen
participation are preferred provided the minimum federal requirements are
met. As discussed, the reason that the TMDL program should serve as a
default process is because the current, complex, and technical TMDL
requirements are not optimal. Instead, they intrude on and potentially
eliminate many of the forces that are likely to produce cleaner waters.' "
In this final section, adjustments and reforms to the TMDL
program are suggested that would lower the costs and increase the
perceived benefits of citizen participation without undercutting current
TMDL requirements that seek to ensure that the states take their water
quality control responsibilities seriously. There do appear to be ways to
better integrate watershed management into water quality control
programs using both science and public participation that do not require
revolutionary adjustments to the current legal terrain, but that do decrease,
intervention, in the form of a genuine threat of a federal takeover."); cf. Paul D. Barker,
Jr., Note, The Chesapeake Bay Preservation Act. The Problem with State Land
Regulation of Interstate Resources, 31 WM. & MARY L. REv. 735, 758 (1990) (criticizing
the State of Maryland regulations governing designation of Chesapeake Bay Preservation
Areas as too flexible given the general tendency of "local government officials" to be
"those most susceptible to powerful lobbying efforts by developers.").
116 See also Harrigan-Lum & Lum, supra note 40, at 62 (concluding that "[t]he present
[TMDL] program does not link watershed management and water quality improvement
in ways that meet either state or community goals in a coherent, easily understood
manner.").
In its recent Final TMDL Regulations, the EPA itself seems to recognize this
problem created by the tedious TMDL process, but it suggests that the statute gives it no
choice but to impose inflexible requirements for the TMDL process on the states. It does
not elaborate, however, on why it views the statute so restrictively. See Final TMDL
Regulations, supra note 11, at 43590 (reporting that "[a] common theme through many
comments was that the Agency should not attempt to force-fit clean up of every
impairment through the TMDL process. The EPA agrees with the commentors that for
some waterbodies and watersheds, existing plans and agreements may accomplish much
of what this rule intends. However, the EPA believes that identifying waterbodies that
are impaired and establishing TMDLs is both statutorily required and will help focus
ongoing activities for more efficient attainment of water quality standards."); see also id.
at 43618 (reporting on numerous comments that raised concerns about the inflexibility of
the TMDL process). In the next paragraph, however, the agency acknowledges that
TMDLs are not required if the state has already promulgated "enforceable" controls that
"will result in attainment of water quality standards by the time the next list in the listing
cycle is required," and makes more specific exemptions for parallel results emerging
from other federal programs, such as Coastal Zone Management plans. Id. Thus, the
agency does appear to allow for deviations from their mandated TMDL process to the
extent that the states act promptly.
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often substantially, participatory barriers that afflict the TMDL program
and its related requirements.
First and most straightforward are revisions to the water quality march
that consolidate and simplify the steps so that citizens can play a larger
role. To some extent, this may also require separating those issues to be
resolved nationally, at the state level, and locally to ensure that citizen
involvement is maximized and that demands for expertise do not serve to
chill citizen participation. 117  Some issues embedded within the water
quality march are perhaps best resolved exclusively at the federal level
because they are far more technical than the other steps. First, the EPA
could establish mandatory minimum national water quality standards or at
least standard methods for determining degradation for the most serious
pollutants, although this might require an amendment to the statute to be
binding on the states."18  Nationalizing minimal pollution standards for
select pollutants would serve the dual purpose of ensuring greater
consistency between states (which is obviously necessary for interstate
waters),"19 while also accommodating the obvious handicap that the
diffused citizenry encounters in participating on state-wide issues that
117 See, e.g., Adler, supra note 1, at 1091 (arguing that "watershed programs require
planning and implementation at multiple, nested scales, allocating roles and
responsibilities as appropriate to each scale."). This tiering is also necessary to minimize
the adverse consequences of over-reliance on local citizen involvement, since in some
communities resources are not sufficient for local citizens to participate. See, e.g., id. at
1102-03 (observing that some mandatory national requirements are necessary because
"[a]reas with adequate political clout, finding, and other resources may benefit from
watershed restoration and protection while others remain polluted.").
118 The EPA has the statutory authority to reject state standards, so it presumably could
implement its oversight authority in a way that approaches binding requirements. See 33
U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2); see also Adler, supra note 9, at 255-56 (discussing various ways
that state water quality standards could be made more consistent). The EPA actively
solicited comments on this question in its proposed TMDL regulation, although it does
not return to the issue in its final rulemaking. See, e.g., Proposed TMDL Rule, supra
note 108, at 46020 ("EPA would also like comments on whether the regulation should
more specifically define national minimum criteria or thresholds that define waterbodies
that are impaired or threatened (e.g., existing criteria used for development of 305(b)
reports).").
See, e.g., Adler, supra note 9, at 253 (concluding based on a comparison to the Clean
Air Act that uniform national standards have the important attribute of consistency from
state to state); cf WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 347-48 (2d ed.
1994) (observing that water quality standards promulgated by different states have a
number of similarities, and suggesting that an informal national consensus between the
states on these standards may be evolving, although as water quality standards become
enforceable requirements, the disparity in approaches taken by states will become more
marked).
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appear largely technical in nature. 120 Mandatory monitoring requirements
also seem appropriate at the national level. 121 Because minimal water
quality standards and monitoring requirements can be designed for
different types of water bodies, they comprise the two features of the
water quality march that appear most capable of being nationalized. 122
Other, more locally-determined features of watershed management,
such as setting public goals for a waterbody and identifying how best to
meet the goals, can also be simplified and streamlined to facilitate, rather
than limit, public involvement. 123  Under the proposal advanced here,
identifying and prioritizing problems and determining how best to address
them would be determined in the first instance by the affected
communities (just as it was in Chesapeake Bay), with little procedural
120 See, e.g., NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, supra note 96, at 24 (observing that
during the review of water quality standards, "[s]pecial interest groups representing
industry, water suppliers, and agriculture weigh in more heavily .... In addition, the
process of updating water quality standards can be very time-consuming which almost
eliminates the public from being closely engaged in this process.").
121 See, e.g., Adler, supra note 9, at 217-18 (detailing that although the EPA has
promulgated extensive guidance (albeit a bit late) on water quality monitoring
procedures, the EPA has not made these procedures mandatory and that the statute
appears largely silent on the issue).
For an example of such requirements, see EPA's latest efforts described in
Development of Nutrient Criteria Guidance for All Regions to Be Accelerated, EPA Says,
29 Env't Rep. 609 (1998).
123 This more participation-friendly approach would necessarily ensure that meaningful
opportunities for public discourse and deliberation over water quality (both the ends and
the means) would be facilitated. This could include the equivalent of town meetings, as
well as more traditional forums soliciting public views. See, e.g., John S. Applegate,
Beyond the Usual Suspects: The Use of Citizens Advisory Boards in Environmental
Decisionmaking, 73 IND. L.J. 903, 952-53 (1998) (outlining the criteria that ensure
meaningful and vigorous public participation); John S. Applegate, Comparative Risk
Assessment and Environmental Priorities Projects: A Forum, Not a Formula, 25 N. KY.
L. REv. 71, 91-108 (1997) (detailing the importance of providing open forums for public
discourse over environmental issues). Thus, the call for greater public involvement
advanced in this article seeks participation at a broad level, including but by no means
limited to or favoring the immediate stakeholders. Recent trends to convene stakeholder
groups, see supra note 111 and accompanying text, and recommendations by the TMDL
FACA group to utilize stakeholders to develop TMDLs, see FACA REPORT, supra note
7, at 73-77, may actually be inconsistent with the recommendations advanced in this
article. The dual assumptions that stakeholders, including environmental nonprofit
groups, are adequate surrogates for citizen involvement and that stakeholder groups can
be held accountable to the public are both dubious and unsupported. Until research
resolves these questions, the presumption should be in favor of broad-based citizen
outreach, with stakeholders emerging naturally through normal channels of broad-based
citizen involvement.
464 [Vol.25:429
2000 RESTORING POLLUTED WATERS WITH PUBLIC VALUES
constraints on how this might best be accomplished. 24 In order to ensure
that the states have sufficient incentive to reinvent their programs to be
more participation-friendly, however, the TMDL program should remain
in place and be retained as a default requirement that can be used if the
streamlined participatory approach is not carried out in a successful or
meaningful way.12  For example, in order to ensure that states have the
124 Cf., Harrigan-Lum & Lum, supra note 40, at 62 (recommending that TMDLs be
prepared first where there is strong community support, "thus concentrating funds for
adequate data collection and implementation in areas where they will do the most
good."). There may be several alternate models for such an approach. The most
promising model comes from the Massachusetts Watershed Initiative, which encourages
local groups to form around watersheds and to develop priorities in cooperation with the
state agencies. See Anderson, supra note 2, at 377-78. In Massachusetts, the residents
assist with collection of monitoring data, setting priorities, and developing public
education projects. Id. at 379-82. Citizens also appear to exert a dominant influence on
the priority setting and implementation of water quality plans in other watershed projects
scattered throughout the country, although the extent to which they come into conflict
with TMDL requirements is unclear. See, e.g., CHESAPEAKE BAY COMMUNITIES, supra
note 59, at 43 (describing "Technical" and "Citizens Steering" committees that seek to
protect the Chickahominy River watershed, one of the cleaner tributaries which drains
into the Chesapeake Bay, with the technical committee providing their results to the
citizen committee and other governmental entities "so that they may ensure the long-term
sustainability of biotic diversity and economic prosperity in the watershed."). President
Clinton's recently unveiled Clean Water Initiative may also offer assistance in lowering
the costs associated with dispersed information on water quality through the development
of its new, integrated database on the health of watersheds available at www.epa.gov/win.
See U.S. EPA, Clean Water Action Plan: Restoring and Protecting America's Waters
(1998), at http://www.cleanwater.gov (last visited Sept. 7, 2000). In order to be effective,
however, these approaches require that the water quality march be capable of being
circumvented, or brought in as a default or penalty for failed water restoration efforts.
125 See, e.g., Adler, supra note 9, at 205 (observing that the EPA views the TMDL
programs as the "backbone of watershed protection.") (quoting Memorandum from
Rober Perciasepe, Assistant Administrator for Water, U.S. EPA, to Regional Water
Division Directors and Water Program Office Directors (Aug. 9, 1996)); Houck IV,
supra note 9, at 10484 (advocating ultimately that the TMDL approach be retained
because it is "the only game in town that nonpoint sources are required to play."); Zaring,
supra note 114, at 527-28 (discussing more generally how little is accomplished under
nonpoint planning provisions because they lack enforceable requirements).
In terms of defaulting to the TMDL program, specific clarifications may be
imperative to make TMDL requirements something to avoid. For the absence of
monitoring data, Professor Adler has suggested that there could be a "presumption that a
water body violates the [water quality standards] after a fixed period of time, absent
adequate monitoring to characterize the health of the watershed by that time." Adler,
supra note 9, at 262; see also id. at 264, 277-79 (suggesting based on a comparison with
the Clean Air Act that deadlines and other more specific requirements for TMDL
programs might increase its effectiveness). In fact, the EPA's Final TMDL Regulations
take the opposite approach by exempting those waters for which there is not monitoring
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appropriate incentives to seek out participation-friendly mechanisms for
addressing water quality problems, an exemption could be provided for
the TMDL process that allows a more streamlined approach to be taken
when available data and technical resources are low and public education
and involvement satisfy high EPA standards. 126  Enforceable limits
imposed on sources under this streamlined process (i.e., 15 percent
reduction in the problem pollutants from all point and nonpoint sources)
would also need to roughly correlate with what might seem necessary
based on the state of the degraded waters.
In identifying a more streamlined process, both defining the goals for a
waterbody and determining how to achieve them could be collapsed into a
data. See, e.g., Proposed TMDL Rule, supra note 108, at 46024 (explaining that "EPA
does not expect States ... to list waterbodies for which there is no existing and readily
available data and information that indicates the existence of an impairment or threat"-
this expectation seems to remain unchanged in the final rule). Professor Adler also
develops suggestions for ways that TMDL calculations can better predict and
accommodate growth based on lessons from the Clean Air Act, see Adler, supra note 9,
at 279-87, and ways that the EPA can be provided with greater oversight and sanction
powers over recalcitrant states. Id. at 289-91.
6 Included in the participation requirements, for example, could also be a more formal
program that provides ready access for citizens to become involyed in the collection of
monitoring data and/or monitoring enforcement obligations to ensure that progress is
being made in water quality protection. Cf FACA REPORT, supra note 7, at 75(recommending that "States and EPA [should] encourage and support high quality
private citizen/entity water quality monitoring and clearly communicate how and when
such information can be incorporated into TMDL development activities. If data are
reliable, they should be used in TMDL development activities."). Many citizen-based
projects emphasize the critical role that the public can play in collecting water quality
data, and the current costs of collecting it without voluntary support further suggest that
including citizens not only in the goal and problem-solving stage, but also during the
implementation and monitoring phases of water quality control, is essential for its
success. See, e.g., CLEAN LAKES, supra note 63, at 13 (reporting that a "1991 survey of
States showed that volunteer lake monitoring programs have been established in 19
States, 12 of them partially funded by the Clean Lakes Program .... The information
collected by volunteers is valuable to State water quality officials during lake assessment
and classification efforts."); NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, supra note 96, at 16-17(discussing the importance of citizen-generated data in understanding watershed health);
Jarrell, supra note 42, at 14, 16-18 (emphasizing this role for citizens and citing state
official in Idaho as emphasizing the critical role the community plays in maintaining
commitments in the TMDL plan and monitoring the river over time); ANN L. RILEY,
RESTORING STREAMS IN CITIES: A GUIDE FOR PLANNERS, POLICY MAKERS, AND
CITIZENS 299-334 (1998) (detailing important role citizens play in restoring watersheds,
particularly with regard to monitoring water quality); Ann Y. Robinson, Citizen
Volunteers Test the Waters (1997), at http://www.earthweshare.org/vwnuobinson.html
(last visited Sept. 7, 2000) (describing the use of citizens to monitor the water quality of
the Flint Creek in Iowa).
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single decision-making exercise for an entire watershed or river.12 7  In
situations where information is inadequate to determine whether a
waterbody meets a publicly-defined water quality goal, the state could
construct presumptions of degradation that could be rebutted by additional
monitoring. 128 In the alternative, the state could establish focused, and
possibly even citizen-assisted monitoring programs that provide limited,
but highly relevant water quality information in an expeditious fashion.' 29
Determining how best to enhance water quality that falls below the public
goal for a particular waterbody (currently the allocation phase of the
TMDL process) could also be done in a more flexible and streamlined
fashion. For example, states could be allowed to set crude, but
enforceable requirements for pollution reductions for all sources (both
point and nonpoint) that discharge the problem pollutant into the degraded
water. Such enforceable requirements could take the form of
127 See, e.g., Adler, supra note 9, at 261-62, 268-69 (recommending that watersheds be
addressed as a unit and that all pollutants be considered at one time).
128 See supra note 125 and accompanying text (discussing this same recommendation).
129 See FACA REPORT, supra note 7, at 74 (recommending that "[w]aters nominated by
the public on the basis of questionable data should be targeted for additional data
collection, where warranted."); cf. Adler, supra note 9, at 260 (suggesting as a
compromise for the limited money available to monitor and assess state waters, that
monies be targeted for waters where problems are least clear, and waters "in which
impairment is predicted defaulting onto the [degraded] list if impairment is not
affirmatively disproven within a prescribed period of time.").
130 This is essentially the approach taken to address the most problematic pollutants
entering the Chesapeake Bay. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. The most
significant advantage to this approach is that it acknowledges and adjusts to the rampant
uncertainties that inflict the TMDL process, while providing room for technical analysis
once the data and modeling resources become more available. Cf FACA REPORT, supra
note 7, at 12 (suggesting that in some cases an "iterative approach [to TMDLs] will allow
for expeditious progress toward attainment of water quality standards as the EPA's
guidance and the general level of scientific understanding continue to improve."). It is
possible, however, that for some water bodies, the primitive approach will also be the
best and final approach to the problem. Not only does it adapt to the data- and science-
poor status of watershed management, but it provides flexibility for additional primitive
adjustments when the conditions of the receiving waters change or when the public goals
for a waterbody change. See, e.g., Healy, supra note 5, at 426-29 (identifying the
uncertainties and changed conditions that make efforts at detailed technical analysis and
"science-justified" permits a failed exercise). Rather than initiating another detailed
technical analysis of a waterbody, the primitive approach provides the state or other
authority with a mechanism that allocates additional reductions fairly and expeditiously,
with far fewer administrative and related transaction costs. Cf. Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z.
Grossman, When Is Command-and-Control Efficient? Institutions, Technology, and the
Comparative Efficiency ofAlternative Regulatory Regimes for Environmental Protection,
1999 Wis. L. REv. 887, 902-05 (arguing that when administrative costs are considered,
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technology-based types of controls on all nonpoint sources and/or setting
percentage reductions for the discharge of the problematic pollutant for all
sources uniformly. These more primitive requirements would then remain
in force until more detailed technical analysis provides a basis for making
adjustments to these requirements. 13 1 Once additional research reveals
that refinements to pollutant reduction requirements are in order, then a
second round of planning can begin that more closely resembles the
existing TMDL process. Other, much more creative solutions are also
likely to emerge once the states and their citizens are permitted some
discretion in identifying ways to minimize problematic pollutants that do
not require, as a preliminary matter, that a series of tedious, technically-
unrealistic steps be followed before enforceable water quality steps can be
implemented.132
Other more indirect approaches to lowering the costs of the water
quality march should also be considered. Two approaches are suggested,
one of which focuses on agency officials and the second of which focuses
on the public. Under the current regulatory program, agency officials
crude approaches like command-and-control standards may be as or even more efficient
than information-intensive, but more finely-tuned standards)
131 See, e.g., Adler, supra note 9, at 288 (recommending technology-based sorts of
controls for nonpoint sources); Adler, supra note 1, at 1069-70 (discussing the equivalent
of technology-based standards for nonpoint sources embodied in the Coastal Zone
Management Act); Houck IV, supra note 9, at 10484-85 (observing that conceptually,
nonpoint sources are very amenable to regulation through technology-based and other
types of environment-blind controls; but political opposition typically prevents such
regulation). But see Adler, supra note 9, at 270-71 (noting that in contrast to point source
controls that can be required to reduce discharges regardless of cost if the receiving
waters require such reductions, under the Clean Water Act "nonpoint source controls,
which need not be mandatory or universal, are selected only according to notions of
feasibility."). The EPA's recent TMDL regulations appear to preclude such an approach,
since they require the states to establish quantitatively that the various source reductions
will ensure that the waters will attain water quality standards. See, e.g., Final TMDL
Regulations, supra note 11, §§ 130.32(b)(6), (7), & (11), at 43667-68. It is not clear from
the statute, however, whether less rigid approaches are also permissible. The Clean
Water Act does require that TMDLs be "established at a level necessary to implement the
applicable water quality standards with seasonal variations and a margin of safety which
takes into account any lack of knowledge concerning the relationship between effluent
limitations and water quality." 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C). But the margin of safety
could be read to permit crude, interim approaches (technology-based controls on
nonpoint sources or identical across-the-board reductions in loading) provided they are
coupled with additional monitoring and a commitment to revisit the waterbody at regular
intervals with additional reductions if necessary.
132 See, e.g., CLEAN LAKES, supra note 63, at 10 (detailing how flexibility in federal
regulations and grants governing clean lakes program facilitates innovation at the state
and local level).
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generally face more incentives to discourage, rather than to encourage
citizen deliberation on issues relating to water quality control.'33 To
improve the amenability of these programs to citizen participation these
perverse incentives must be reversed. State delegations to administer the
Clean Water Act could be approved only after a state has designed
meaningful, low cost mechanisms for citizen participation and education.
Grants or even awards could be meted out for innovative solutions to
public participation challenges. Providing basic information, including
information on how the process works and a centralization of contacts and
authority and decisions, would be among the requirements to be satisfied
if a state is to take control of its water quality control program. 134 In some
states it might also be desirable to provide local governments with
133 From the perspective of the agency official, more citizen involvement brings a
potentially significant drain on staff time and already limited administrative resources.
See, e.g., FACA REPORT, supra note 7, at 73 (observing that "conveying the complex,
often technical information associated with TMDLs is difficult, time-consuming, and
resource-intensive for State agencies."). Cf Mazmanian & Nienaber, supra note 101, at
227-30, 245 (detailing the internal resistance to public participation within the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers and concluding that pressure for change must come from outside the
agency, as well as from within). To extent that participation or citizen outreach is not
required, then, it becomes a pro bono governmental activity with large opportunity costs.
See generally Helen Ingrain, The Politics of Information: Constraints on New Sources, in
WATER POLITICS AND PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT, supra note 63, at 63, 64 (hypothesizing and
then elaborating on the proposition that "inputs from new publics will be used when their
utility to policy-makers is greater than the cost of using them."). Additionally, greater
participation is perceived to lead to more controversy, more protracted debates, more
comments, longer hearings, and a greater chance of law suits. Finally, agency officials
lose control over the outcome to the extent that citizen input becomes influential. Other
stakeholders are likely more worried about this adverse consequence of open
participation than agencies, but agency staff may be concerned to the extent that they get
directions from the governor or have their own personal goals for water quality that they
seek to advance in their public service position.
134 The new TMDL regulations provide only minimal assurances for public participation
(§ 130.36), requiring simply that states provide a notice and comment period at various
stages in the TMDL process and that states develop mailing lists to ensure that their
notices are widely disseminated. See Final TMDL Regulations, supra note 11, at 43634-
35, 43669-70. However, the EPA is also in the process of revising its general 1981
public participation policy, a policy that recognizes the need to provide citizens with high
quality information and meaningful access to the decision-making process. Ideally, this
broader policy document could be tailored to the specific demands of the TMDL process
in order to provide the states with clear direction as to the types of participation programs
that are considered adequate. See, e.g., EPA, Notice, Review of Environmental
Protection Agency Public Participation Policies, 64 Fed. Reg. 66906, 66908 (1999)
(detailing the types of materials that should be provided to ensure that the public is
adequately informed).
469
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
additional legal authority to protect local water quality. 135 While localities
play an important role as participants (or stakeholders) in the TMDL
process, the authority to act independently of the Clean Water Act to
address land use or other problems that degrade water quality would
provide yet another important opportunity for public involvement.
With respect to enhancing the public's voice in water quality
decisions, at least two separate approaches could lower the costs of
participation and counteract the artificially reduced benefits of that
participation. The first set of reforms would endeavor to facilitate
collective action by citizens. This could be accomplished by providing
generous funding for grassroots activities, a gesture that both motivates
collective action and reduces the costs of organizing. 136 Certain states or
communities could also take the lead and create an elected position for an
environmental quality representative who helps inform and advocate on
behalf of the larger community. While current elected local officials may
also serve this role, focusing the responsibilities helps to ensure that those
serving as environmental officials adequately represent citizen views on
environmental quality decisions and have the time available to develop the
needed expertise. The second reform, directed at the public itself, would
provide high quality, balanced information to citizens (as is currently done
in the Chesapeake Bay watershed), thus lowering at least some of the costs
of participation and restoring the artificially reduced stakes that currently
distort the public participation picture. Currently, citizen guides that assist
citizens with the technical issues associated with water quality abound, 37
but much less effort has been dedicated towards helping citizens navigate
the legal maze in order to put their technical knowledge into practice.'
D3
U.) See, e.g., Butler, supra note 115, at 927-31 (advocating changes in state-local
authority structures that discourage or actively prevent local governments from acting to
address environmental problems).
136 Pursuant to President Clinton's Clean Water Initiative, supra note 124, a series of
grants and awards are already available to help community groups organize and engage
in watershed protection agencies. See Clean Water Action Plan, supra note 124, at ch. 3.
137 See, e.g., BOLLING, supra note 65; NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, supra note 61; NORTH
AMERICAN LAKE MANAGEMENT SOCIETY, LAKE AND RESERVOIR RESTORATION
GUIDANCE MANUAL (Lynn Moore & Kent Thornton eds., 1988); OHIO EPA DIVISION OF
SURFACE WATER, supra note 82; TERRENE INSTITUTE, supra note 88; Center for
Watershed Protection, Watershed Leadership Kit CD-ROMs, at http://www.cwp.org (last
visited Oct. 4, 2000).
138 See supra note 137 (none of the guides provide assistance on the legal requirements).
In fact, in several of the guides, for example, TERRENE INSTITUTE, supra note 88, citizens
are encouraged to develop community goals and implement plans without even outlining
for citizens the parallel procedures for protecting water quality under the Clean Water
Act.
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The technical guides are also not especially helpful in calling attention to
the many uncertainties and assumptions that afflict water quality
science.1 39  Yet detailed citizen guides could help demystify
environmental policy-making for citizens in their local communities.
140
V. CONCLUSION
One of the reasons that water quality programs have not progressed
quickly or successfully stems from features of the regulatory process that
alienates, rather than invites, citizen involvement. As the methods for
protecting water quality become increasingly rigid and dependent on
technocratic solutions, they crowd out meaningful opportunities for citizen
input by raising the costs and lowering the perceived benefits of joining
the decision-making exercise. This is particularly problematic since the
current technocratic/legalistic artifice has a weak foundation-resting on
little data, sorely incomplete science, and difficult political decisions about
allocating loads among polluters, many of whom otherwise escape
meaningful regulation. Without public input and support, these programs
are destined to drift in a state of analytical paralysis. Watershed
management will only become successfully integrated in our water quality
programs once these significant participatory failings have been mended.
By contrast, there is one guide available that does orient the citizen toward the
law. The National Wildlife Federation has developed an excellent guide to assist citizens
in participating in the TMDL process. See NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, supra note
96. The guide is invaluable, but obviously cannot assist citizens with state issues that
often arise in unique ways during the TMDL process. See, e.g., id. at 15, 17, 21
(identifying, where possible, certain problems that arise in "some" states, but lacking
more detailed discussion of the problems because of the national nature of the guide).
Thus, much more work, often on a state-specific level, is necessary to provide citizens
with the help that they need. Additionally, the National Wildlife Federation Guide has
not been widely publicized by states or even the U.S. EPA, making it a difficult tool for
many citizen activists to locate.
139 See, e.g., OHIO EPA DIVISION OF SURFACE WATER, supra note 82, at 12-29 (warning
citizens that after accessing "multiple lines of' technical data, "conclusions may only be
an educated best guess," but failing in the subsequent detailed explanations of water
quality indicators to identify any sources of uncertainty or variability in the multiple
measures or quantitative figures).
140 If law students developed these citizen materials, in fact, it could be a dual success
for the citizen and the students: the students would learn how to practice environmental
law and accomplish something tangible and positive at the same time. The current
discontent with legal education, and the particular frustration of environmental law
professors, in particular with respect to the current challenge of teaching a complex
substantive course in a relatively passive classroom setting, may provide added impetus
for such a project.
